According to Schopenhauer, moral freedom cannot be understood as a power that man would have, at every action, to decide to act in one way or another on the basis of his own will. Although human actions are subject to the strictest necessity, responsibility is possible since man's will as a thing in itself, its intelligible character, is free. Moreover, Schopenhauer argues that the world is governed by eternal justice. According to this notion, the attribution of moral responsibility to the tormentor for the sufferings he causes to the tormented is linked to a difference that does not affect the thing itself. Tormentor and the victim are one, since the will lives in both. In this article, I explore these points to try to show Schopenhauer's failure to elucidate judgments of moral responsibility.According to Schopenhauer, moral freedom cannot be understood as a power that man would have, at every action, to decide to act in one way or another on the basis of his own will. Although human actions are subject to the strictest necessity, responsibility is possible since man's will as a thing in itself, its intelligible character, is free. Moreover, Schopenhauer argues that the world is governed by eternal justice. According to this notion, the attribution of moral responsibility to the tormentor for the sufferings he causes to the tormented is linked to a difference that does not affect the thing itself. Tormentor and the victim are one, since the will lives in both. In this article, I explore these points to try to show Schopenhauer's failure to elucidate judgments of moral responsibility.According to Schopenhauer, moral freedom cannot be understood as a power that man would have, at every action, to decide to act in one way or another on the basis of his own will. Although human actions are subject to the strictest necessity, responsibility is possible since man's will as a thing in itself, its intelligible character, is free. Moreover, Schopenhauer argues that the world is governed by eternal justice. According to this notion, the attribution of moral responsibility to the tormentor for the sufferings he causes to the tormented is linked to a difference that does not affect the thing itself. Tormentor and the victim are one, since the will lives in both. In this article, I explore these points to try to show Schopenhauer's failure to elucidate judgments of moral responsibility.According to Schopenhauer, moral freedom cannot be understood as a power that man would have, at every action, to decide to act in one way or another on the basis of his own will. Although human actions are subject to the strictest necessity, responsibility is possible since man's will as a thing in itself, its intelligible character, is free. Moreover, Schopenhauer argues that the world is governed by eternal justice. According to this notion, the attribution of moral responsibility to the tormentor for the sufferings he causes to the tormented is linked to a difference that does not affect the thing itself. Tormentor and the victim are one, since the will lives in both. In this article, I explore these points to try to show Schopenhauer's failure to elucidate judgments of moral responsibility.According to Schopenhauer, moral freedom cannot be understood as a power that man would have, at every action, to decide to act in one way or another on the basis of his own will. Although human actions are subject to the strictest necessity, responsibility is possible since man's will as a thing in itself, its intelligible character, is free. Moreover, Schopenhauer argues that the world is governed by eternal justice. According to this notion, the attribution of moral responsibility to the tormentor for the sufferings he causes to the tormented is linked to a difference that does not affect the thing itself. Tormentor and the victim are one, since the will lives in both. In this article, I explore these points to try to show Schopenhauer's failure to elucidate judgments of moral responsibility.Para Schopenhauer, a liberdade moral não pode ser entendida como um poder que o homem teria de, a cada ação, decidir agir de um modo ou de outro com base em sua própria vontade. Embora as ações humanas estejam submetidas à mais estrita necessidade, a responsabilidade é possível haja vista que a vontade do homem como coisa em si, seu caráter inteligível, é livre. Além disso, Schopenhauer defende que o mundo é regido pela justiça eterna. De acordo com essa noção, a atribuição responsabilidade moral ao atormentador pelos sofrimentos que causa ao atormentado prende-se a uma diferença que não atinge a coisa em si. Algoz e vítima são unos, visto que a vontade vive em ambos. Nesse artigo, exploro esses pontos para tentar mostrar o insucesso de Schopenhauer ao tentar elucidar os juízos de responsabilidade moral.