Freedom, moral responsibility and eternal justice in Schopenhauer

Freedom, moral responsibility and eternal justice in Schopenhauer;
Freedom, moral responsibility and eternal justice in Schopenhauer;
Freedom, moral responsibility and eternal justice in Schopenhauer;
Freedom, moral responsibility and eternal justice in Schopenhauer;
Liberdade, responsabilidade moral e justiça eterna em Schopenhauer

dc.creatorPavão, Aguinaldo
dc.date2019-12-18
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-27T19:48:57Z
dc.date.available2023-09-27T19:48:57Z
dc.identifierhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/41083
dc.identifier10.5902/2179378641083
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8942210
dc.descriptionAccording to Schopenhauer, moral freedom cannot be understood as a power that man would have, at every action, to decide to act in one way or another on the basis of his own will. Although human actions are subject to the strictest necessity, responsibility is possible since man's will as a thing in itself, its intelligible character, is free. Moreover, Schopenhauer argues that the world is governed by eternal justice. According to this notion, the attribution of moral responsibility to the tormentor for the sufferings he causes to the tormented is linked to a difference that does not affect the thing itself. Tormentor and the victim are one, since the will lives in both. In this article, I explore these points to try to show Schopenhauer's failure to elucidate judgments of moral responsibility.de-DE
dc.descriptionAccording to Schopenhauer, moral freedom cannot be understood as a power that man would have, at every action, to decide to act in one way or another on the basis of his own will. Although human actions are subject to the strictest necessity, responsibility is possible since man's will as a thing in itself, its intelligible character, is free. Moreover, Schopenhauer argues that the world is governed by eternal justice. According to this notion, the attribution of moral responsibility to the tormentor for the sufferings he causes to the tormented is linked to a difference that does not affect the thing itself. Tormentor and the victim are one, since the will lives in both. In this article, I explore these points to try to show Schopenhauer's failure to elucidate judgments of moral responsibility.en-US
dc.descriptionAccording to Schopenhauer, moral freedom cannot be understood as a power that man would have, at every action, to decide to act in one way or another on the basis of his own will. Although human actions are subject to the strictest necessity, responsibility is possible since man's will as a thing in itself, its intelligible character, is free. Moreover, Schopenhauer argues that the world is governed by eternal justice. According to this notion, the attribution of moral responsibility to the tormentor for the sufferings he causes to the tormented is linked to a difference that does not affect the thing itself. Tormentor and the victim are one, since the will lives in both. In this article, I explore these points to try to show Schopenhauer's failure to elucidate judgments of moral responsibility.es-ES
dc.descriptionAccording to Schopenhauer, moral freedom cannot be understood as a power that man would have, at every action, to decide to act in one way or another on the basis of his own will. Although human actions are subject to the strictest necessity, responsibility is possible since man's will as a thing in itself, its intelligible character, is free. Moreover, Schopenhauer argues that the world is governed by eternal justice. According to this notion, the attribution of moral responsibility to the tormentor for the sufferings he causes to the tormented is linked to a difference that does not affect the thing itself. Tormentor and the victim are one, since the will lives in both. In this article, I explore these points to try to show Schopenhauer's failure to elucidate judgments of moral responsibility.fr-FR
dc.descriptionAccording to Schopenhauer, moral freedom cannot be understood as a power that man would have, at every action, to decide to act in one way or another on the basis of his own will. Although human actions are subject to the strictest necessity, responsibility is possible since man's will as a thing in itself, its intelligible character, is free. Moreover, Schopenhauer argues that the world is governed by eternal justice. According to this notion, the attribution of moral responsibility to the tormentor for the sufferings he causes to the tormented is linked to a difference that does not affect the thing itself. Tormentor and the victim are one, since the will lives in both. In this article, I explore these points to try to show Schopenhauer's failure to elucidate judgments of moral responsibility.it-IT
dc.descriptionPara Schopenhauer, a liberdade moral não pode ser entendida como um poder que o homem teria de, a cada ação, decidir agir de um modo ou de outro com base em sua própria vontade. Embora as ações humanas estejam submetidas à mais estrita necessidade, a responsabilidade é possível haja vista que a vontade do homem como coisa em si, seu caráter inteligível, é livre. Além disso, Schopenhauer defende que o mundo é regido pela justiça eterna. De acordo com essa noção, a atribuição responsabilidade moral ao atormentador pelos sofrimentos que causa ao atormentado prende-se a uma diferença que não atinge a coisa em si. Algoz e vítima são unos, visto que a vontade vive em ambos. Nesse artigo, exploro esses pontos para tentar mostrar o insucesso de Schopenhauer ao tentar elucidar os juízos de responsabilidade moral.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/html
dc.languagepor
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Santa Mariapt-BR
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/41083/pdf
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/41083/html
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2019 Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofiapt-BR
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Bd. 10 Nr. 3 (2019): Dossier Philosophien des Gedächtnis + Schopenhauer-Studien; 212 - 229de-DE
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 10 No. 3 (2019): Dossier Philosophies of Memory + Schopenhauerian Studies; 212 - 229en-US
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 10 Núm. 3 (2019): Dossier Philosophies of Memory + Schopenhauerian Studies; 212 - 229es-ES
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 10 No 3 (2019): Dossiê Filosofias da Memória + Estudos Schopenhaurianos; 212 - 229fr-FR
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; V. 10 N. 3 (2019): Dossier Filosofie della memoria + Studi Schopenhaueriani; 212 - 229it-IT
dc.sourceVoluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 10 n. 3 (2019): Dossiê Filosofias da Memória + Estudos Schopenhaurianos; 212 - 229pt-BR
dc.source2179-3786
dc.subjectFreedomde-DE
dc.subjectResponsibilityde-DE
dc.subjectWillde-DE
dc.subjectEternal justicede-DE
dc.subjectFreedomen-US
dc.subjectResponsibilityen-US
dc.subjectWillen-US
dc.subjectEternal justiceen-US
dc.subjectFreedomes-ES
dc.subjectResponsibilityes-ES
dc.subjectWilles-ES
dc.subjectEternal justicees-ES
dc.subjectFreedomfr-FR
dc.subjectResponsibilityfr-FR
dc.subjectWillfr-FR
dc.subjectEternal justicefr-FR
dc.subjectFreedomit-IT
dc.subjectResponsibilityit-IT
dc.subjectWillit-IT
dc.subjectEternal justiceit-IT
dc.subjectLiberdadept-BR
dc.subjectResponsabilidadept-BR
dc.subjectVontadept-BR
dc.subjectJustiça eternapt-BR
dc.titleFreedom, moral responsibility and eternal justice in Schopenhauerde-DE
dc.titleFreedom, moral responsibility and eternal justice in Schopenhaueren-US
dc.titleFreedom, moral responsibility and eternal justice in Schopenhaueres-ES
dc.titleFreedom, moral responsibility and eternal justice in Schopenhauerfr-FR
dc.titleFreedom, moral responsibility and eternal justice in Schopenhauerit-IT
dc.titleLiberdade, responsabilidade moral e justiça eterna em Schopenhauerpt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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