We propose to analyse and interpret in what sense Philonenko’s description that Schopenhauer developed a “phenomenology of ethical life” can be read without complications: if we stick it to his empirical foundation of morals, exposed in On the Foundation of Morals. If we extend it to the philosopher's metaphysics of customs, as Philonenko did, this expression will be inadequate, because the latter does not have the phenomena as its object, but what “hides behind them (...) the thing in itself”. This clarification will also help us to show in what sense Schopenhauer scientifically innovated in morals, by redirecting human actions to three fundamental reasons: the well-being of others, of ourselves and the discomfort of others (predicated, respectively, by selfishness, goodness and malevolence); and by explaining the possibility of the second motivation as coming from the feeling of compassion (which is divisible in a negative degree, that of justice, and a positive one, charity).We propose to analyse and interpret in what sense Philonenko’s description that Schopenhauer developed a “phenomenology of ethical life” can be read without complications: if we stick it to his empirical foundation of morals, exposed in On the Foundation of Morals. If we extend it to the philosopher's metaphysics of customs, as Philonenko did, this expression will be inadequate, because the latter does not have the phenomena as its object, but what “hides behind them (...) the thing in itself”. This clarification will also help us to show in what sense Schopenhauer scientifically innovated in morals, by redirecting human actions to three fundamental reasons: the well-being of others, of ourselves and the discomfort of others (predicated, respectively, by selfishness, goodness and malevolence); and by explaining the possibility of the second motivation as coming from the feeling of compassion (which is divisible in a negative degree, that of justice, and a positive one, charity).We propose to analyse and interpret in what sense Philonenko’s description that Schopenhauer developed a “phenomenology of ethical life” can be read without complications: if we stick it to his empirical foundation of morals, exposed in On the Foundation of Morals. If we extend it to the philosopher's metaphysics of customs, as Philonenko did, this expression will be inadequate, because the latter does not have the phenomena as its object, but what “hides behind them (...) the thing in itself”. This clarification will also help us to show in what sense Schopenhauer scientifically innovated in morals, by redirecting human actions to three fundamental reasons: the well-being of others, of ourselves and the discomfort of others (predicated, respectively, by selfishness, goodness and malevolence); and by explaining the possibility of the second motivation as coming from the feeling of compassion (which is divisible in a negative degree, that of justice, and a positive one, charity).We propose to analyse and interpret in what sense Philonenko’s description that Schopenhauer developed a “phenomenology of ethical life” can be read without complications: if we stick it to his empirical foundation of morals, exposed in On the Foundation of Morals. If we extend it to the philosopher's metaphysics of customs, as Philonenko did, this expression will be inadequate, because the latter does not have the phenomena as its object, but what “hides behind them (...) the thing in itself”. This clarification will also help us to show in what sense Schopenhauer scientifically innovated in morals, by redirecting human actions to three fundamental reasons: the well-being of others, of ourselves and the discomfort of others (predicated, respectively, by selfishness, goodness and malevolence); and by explaining the possibility of the second motivation as coming from the feeling of compassion (which is divisible in a negative degree, that of justice, and a positive one, charity).We propose to analyse and interpret in what sense Philonenko’s description that Schopenhauer developed a “phenomenology of ethical life” can be read without complications: if we stick it to his empirical foundation of morals, exposed in On the Foundation of Morals. If we extend it to the philosopher's metaphysics of customs, as Philonenko did, this expression will be inadequate, because the latter does not have the phenomena as its object, but what “hides behind them (...) the thing in itself”. This clarification will also help us to show in what sense Schopenhauer scientifically innovated in morals, by redirecting human actions to three fundamental reasons: the well-being of others, of ourselves and the discomfort of others (predicated, respectively, by selfishness, goodness and malevolence); and by explaining the possibility of the second motivation as coming from the feeling of compassion (which is divisible in a negative degree, that of justice, and a positive one, charity).Nós nos propomos analisar e interpretar em que sentido a descrição de Philonenko de que Schopenhauer desenvolveu uma “fenomenologia da vida ética” pode ser lida sem grandes problemas, se nos detivermos à sua fundamentação empírica da moral, exposta em Sobre o Fundamento da Moral. Caso a estendamos à metafísica dos costumes do filósofo, como fez Philonenko, essa expressão já será inadequada pelo fato da última não ter por objeto nenhum fenômeno, mas o que se “esconde por trás deles (...), a coisa em si mesma”. Esse esclarecimento também nos ajudará a evidenciar que Schopenhauer inovou cientificamente, na moral, ao reconduzir as ações humanas a três motivos fundamentais: o bem-estar próprio, alheio e o mal-estar alheio (predicados, respectivamente, por egoísmo, bondade e malevolência); e ao explicar a possibilidade da segunda motivação como oriunda do sentimento da compaixão (divisível em um grau negativo, o da justiça, e um positivo, a caridade).