In this paper, I will show some arguments that reinforce the idea that the Parmenides was considered a logical dialogue during the Middle Platonism. I will consider what some authors say, although in different ages, about how the Parmenides of Plato has been read. My aim is also to display that they were in a general accordance: actually, given these concordances, the probability that this work was classified among the logical dialogues becomes much more plausible. The main source for establishing this is represented by Proclus who, in his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, discusses about the traditions of interpretation connected with this dialogue, proposing a classification in which is included also the ‘logical way’. On the basis of the analysis of some passages of Alcinous’ Didaskalikos (ch. 6), and of some references present in Diogenes Laertius’ Vitae Philosophorum (III, 49), and given some indications in Albinus (Isagoge, III, 148, 19 ff., VI, 151, 5-7), it is possible to hypothesize with a certain degree of truth that the Parmenides, for some middleplatonists, in some respects, and more generally for the Middleplatonism, represented an ‘explanatory dialogue’ or ‘expository dialogue’ (ὑφεγηματικός) which contained the indications to learn the logical method, while at the same time providing an example of how to exercise in order to learn it.In this paper, I will show some arguments that reinforce the idea that the Parmenides was considered a logical dialogue during the Middle Platonism. I will consider what some authors say, although in different ages, about how the Parmenides of Plato has been read. My aim is also to display that they were in a general accordance: actually, given these concordances, the probability that this work was classified among the logical dialogues becomes much more plausible. The main source for establishing this is represented by Proclus who, in his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, discusses about the traditions of interpretation connected with this dialogue, proposing a classification in which is included also the ‘logical way’. On the basis of the analysis of some passages of Alcinous’ Didaskalikos (ch. 6), and of some references present in Diogenes Laertius’ Vitae Philosophorum (III, 49), and given some indications in Albinus (Isagoge, III, 148, 19 ff., VI, 151, 5-7), it is possible to hypothesize with a certain degree of truth that the Parmenides, for some middleplatonists, in some respects, and more generally for the Middleplatonism, represented an ‘explanatory dialogue’ or ‘expository dialogue’ (ὑφεγηματικός) which contained the indications to learn the logical method, while at the same time providing an example of how to exercise in order to learn it.In this paper, I will show some arguments that reinforce the idea that the Parmenides was considered a logical dialogue during the Middle Platonism. I will consider what some authors say, although in different ages, about how the Parmenides of Plato has been read. My aim is also to display that they were in a general accordance: actually, given these concordances, the probability that this work was classified among the logical dialogues becomes much more plausible. The main source for establishing this is represented by Proclus who, in his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, discusses about the traditions of interpretation connected with this dialogue, proposing a classification in which is included also the ‘logical way’. On the basis of the analysis of some passages of Alcinous’ Didaskalikos (ch. 6), and of some references present in Diogenes Laertius’ Vitae Philosophorum (III, 49), and given some indications in Albinus (Isagoge, III, 148, 19 ff., VI, 151, 5-7), it is possible to hypothesize with a certain degree of truth that the Parmenides, for some middleplatonists, in some respects, and more generally for the Middleplatonism, represented an ‘explanatory dialogue’ or ‘expository dialogue’ (ὑφεγηματικός) which contained the indications to learn the logical method, while at the same time providing an example of how to exercise in order to learn it.In this paper, I will show some arguments that reinforce the idea that the Parmenides was considered a logical dialogue during the Middle Platonism. I will consider what some authors say, although in different ages, about how the Parmenides of Plato has been read. My aim is also to display that they were in a general accordance: actually, given these concordances, the probability that this work was classified among the logical dialogues becomes much more plausible. The main source for establishing this is represented by Proclus who, in his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, discusses about the traditions of interpretation connected with this dialogue, proposing a classification in which is included also the ‘logical way’. On the basis of the analysis of some passages of Alcinous’ Didaskalikos (ch. 6), and of some references present in Diogenes Laertius’ Vitae Philosophorum (III, 49), and given some indications in Albinus (Isagoge, III, 148, 19 ff., VI, 151, 5-7), it is possible to hypothesize with a certain degree of truth that the Parmenides, for some middleplatonists, in some respects, and more generally for the Middleplatonism, represented an ‘explanatory dialogue’ or ‘expository dialogue’ (ὑφεγηματικός) which contained the indications to learn the logical method, while at the same time providing an example of how to exercise in order to learn it.In this paper, I will show some arguments that reinforce the idea that the Parmenides was considered a logical dialogue during the Middle Platonism. I will consider what some authors say, although in different ages, about how the Parmenides of Plato has been read. My aim is also to display that they were in a general accordance: actually, given these concordances, the probability that this work was classified among the logical dialogues becomes much more plausible. The main source for establishing this is represented by Proclus who, in his Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, discusses about the traditions of interpretation connected with this dialogue, proposing a classification in which is included also the ‘logical way’. On the basis of the analysis of some passages of Alcinous’ Didaskalikos (ch. 6), and of some references present in Diogenes Laertius’ Vitae Philosophorum (III, 49), and given some indications in Albinus (Isagoge, III, 148, 19 ff., VI, 151, 5-7), it is possible to hypothesize with a certain degree of truth that the Parmenides, for some middleplatonists, in some respects, and more generally for the Middleplatonism, represented an ‘explanatory dialogue’ or ‘expository dialogue’ (ὑφεγηματικός) which contained the indications to learn the logical method, while at the same time providing an example of how to exercise in order to learn it.Neste artigo, mostrarei alguns argumentos que reforçam a ideia de que o Parmênides foi considerado um diálogo lógico durante o médio platonismo. Vou considerar o que alguns autores dizem, embora em diferentes épocas, sobre como o Parmênides de Platão foi lido. Meu objetivo é também mostrar que eles estiveram em um acordo geral: na verdade, dadas essas concordâncias, a probabilidade de que esta obra tenha sido classificada entre os diálogos lógicos se torna muito mais plausível. A principal fonte para estabelecer isso é representada por Proclo, que, em seu Comentário sobre o Parmênides de Platão, discute as tradições de interpretação relacionadas a este diálogo, propondo uma classificação na qual também está incluído o ‘modo lógico’. Com base na análise de algumas passagens do Didaskalikos de Alcino (cap. 6) e de algumas referências presentes na Vitae Philosophorum de Diógenes Laércio (III, 49), e com algumas indicações em Albino (Isagoge, III, 148, 19 e segs., VI, 151, 5-7), é possível supor com certo grau de verdade que o Parmênides, para alguns médios platonistas, em alguns aspectos, e mais geralmente para o médio platonismo, representava um ‘diálogo explicativo’ ou ‘diálogo expositivo’ (ὑφεγηματικός) que continha as indicações para aprender o método lógico, fornecendo ao mesmo tempo um exemplo de como se exercitar para aprendê-lo.