In this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradox.In this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradox.In this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradox. In this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradox.In this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradox.In this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradoNeste artigo, examino a duplicidade de sentidos que a tese pluralista “os seres são múltiplos” ou “se há múltiplos seres” (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comporta: pode significar uma multiplicade numérica, isto é: a tese de que há mais de uma coisa no mundo, assim como pode significar que uma mesma coisa possui mais de um atributo. Incialmente, argumento que Sócrates estava consciente desta ambiguidade, pois as duas compreensões de pluralismo representam perspectivas complementares de uma mesma posição filosófica. Segundo minha interpretação, o reconhecimento dessa ambiguidade permite melhor entender a crítica de Sócrates ao monismo eleático, sua defesa da Teoria das Ideias e sua distinção entre Formas transcendentes e propriedades imanentes. Estes dois sentidos de multiplicidade farão ainda parte da estratégia utilizada por Parmênides na sua contra-argumentação à solução socrática ao paradoxo de Zenão.