Many things or Multiple things? - Two Senses for Zeno’s Paradox in Plato’s "Parmenides";
Many things or Multiple things? - Two Senses for Zeno’s Paradox in Plato’s "Parmenides";
Many things or Multiple things? - Two Senses for Zeno’s Paradox in Plato’s "Parmenides";
Many things or Multiple things? - Two Senses for Zeno’s Paradox in Plato’s "Parmenides";
Múltiplas coisas ou Coisas Múltiplas? - Dois sentidos para o Paradoxo de Zenão no "Parmênides" de Platão

dc.creatorMatoso, Renato
dc.date2020-04-15
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-27T19:49:01Z
dc.date.available2023-09-27T19:49:01Z
dc.identifierhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/43310
dc.identifier10.5902/2179378643310
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8942222
dc.descriptionIn this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradox.de-DE
dc.descriptionIn this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradox.en-US
dc.descriptionIn this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradox. es-ES
dc.descriptionIn this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradox.fr-FR
dc.descriptionIn this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradox.In this paper, I propose an original interpretation for the duplicity of meanings that the pluralistic thesis (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comprises: it can mean a numerical multiplicity, that is: the thesis that there is more than one thing in the world, as well as can mean that the same thing has more than one attribute. Here it is argued that Socrates was aware of this ambiguity, and that these two understandings of pluralism represent complementary perspectives on the same philosophical position. This interpretation allows me to better understand Socrates’ criticism against the Eleatic monism, and his distinction between Forms and immanent properties. Finally, I demonstrate how these two meanings of multiplicity are also part of the strategy used by Parmenides in his counter-argument to the Socratic solution to Zeno’s paradoit-IT
dc.descriptionNeste artigo, examino a duplicidade de sentidos que a tese pluralista “os seres são múltiplos” ou “se há múltiplos seres” (πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα) comporta: pode significar uma multiplicade numérica, isto é: a tese de que há mais de uma coisa no mundo, assim como pode significar que uma mesma coisa possui mais de um atributo. Incialmente, argumento que Sócrates estava consciente desta ambiguidade, pois as duas compreensões de pluralismo representam perspectivas complementares de uma mesma posição filosófica. Segundo minha interpretação, o reconhecimento dessa ambiguidade permite melhor entender a crítica de Sócrates ao monismo eleático, sua defesa da Teoria das Ideias e sua distinção entre Formas transcendentes e propriedades imanentes. Estes dois sentidos de multiplicidade farão ainda parte da estratégia utilizada por Parmênides na sua contra-argumentação à solução socrática ao paradoxo de Zenão.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/html
dc.languagepor
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Santa Mariapt-BR
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/43310/pdf
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/43310/html
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2020 Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofiapt-BR
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Bd. 11 Nr. 1 (2020): Dossier Der "Parmenides" Platons + Schopenhauer-Studien; 52 - 69de-DE
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2020): Dossier Plato's "Parmenides" + Schopenhauerian Studies; 52 - 69en-US
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 11 Núm. 1 (2020): Dossier El "Parménides" de Platon + Estudios Schopenhauerianos; 52 - 69es-ES
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 11 No 1 (2020): Dossiê O "Parmênides" de Platão + Estudos Schopenhauerianos; 52 - 69fr-FR
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; V. 11 N. 1 (2020): Dossier Il "Parmenide" di Platone + Studi Schopenhaueriani; 52 - 69it-IT
dc.sourceVoluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 11 n. 1 (2020): Dossiê O "Parmênides" de Platão + Estudos Schopenhauerianos; 52 - 69pt-BR
dc.source2179-3786
dc.subjectEleatic monismde-DE
dc.subjectNumerical pluralismde-DE
dc.subjectAttribute pluralismde-DE
dc.subjectFormsde-DE
dc.subjectEleatic monismen-US
dc.subjectNumerical pluralismen-US
dc.subjectAttribute pluralismen-US
dc.subjectFormsen-US
dc.subjectEleatic monismes-ES
dc.subjectNumerical pluralismes-ES
dc.subjectAttribute pluralismes-ES
dc.subjectFormses-ES
dc.subjectEleatic monismfr-FR
dc.subjectNumerical pluralismfr-FR
dc.subjectAttribute pluralismfr-FR
dc.subjectFormsfr-FR
dc.subjectEleatic monismit-IT
dc.subjectNumerical pluralismit-IT
dc.subjectAttribute pluralismit-IT
dc.subjectFormsit-IT
dc.subjectMonismo eleáticopt-BR
dc.subjectPluralismo numéricopt-BR
dc.subjectPluralismo de atributospt-BR
dc.subjectFormaspt-BR
dc.titleMany things or Multiple things? - Two Senses for Zeno’s Paradox in Plato’s "Parmenides"de-DE
dc.titleMany things or Multiple things? - Two Senses for Zeno’s Paradox in Plato’s "Parmenides"en-US
dc.titleMany things or Multiple things? - Two Senses for Zeno’s Paradox in Plato’s "Parmenides"es-ES
dc.titleMany things or Multiple things? - Two Senses for Zeno’s Paradox in Plato’s "Parmenides"fr-FR
dc.titleMany things or Multiple things? - Two Senses for Zeno’s Paradox in Plato’s "Parmenides"it-IT
dc.titleMúltiplas coisas ou Coisas Múltiplas? - Dois sentidos para o Paradoxo de Zenão no "Parmênides" de Platãopt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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