Strategic incentives for medical residency allocation: An examination of the peruvian matching program

Abstract

This paper presents a comprehensive study of the SERUMS program in Peru, a critical mechanism for assigning recently graduated healthcare professionals to various positions in healthcenters. The primary objective of this program is to provide comprehensive healthcare to the nation’s most vulnerable populations. Our findings reveal that the enforcement of SERUMS requirements for future applications to specialties or public contests renders the distribution of points irrelevant in student decisions. We also studied the equilibrium with the elimination of the requirement. The elimination of the SERUMS requirement in the incentive structures showed that the magnitude of bonuses, particularly low bonuses, plays a crucial role in students’ decisions. Additionally, the number of vacancies with high bonuses positively impacts student participation up to a certain point. Our findings underscore the complex interplay between incentive structures, program requirements, and regional disparities, highlighting the need for careful policy considerations to optimize the impact of the SERUMS program on healthcare distribution in Peru.