Zu den Bedürfnissen theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft

On the needs of theoretical and practical reason;
On the needs of theoretical and practical reason;
On the needs of theoretical and practical reason;
On the needs of theoretical and practical reason;
Sobre as necessidades da razão teórica e prática

dc.creatorHamm, Christian
dc.date2020-04-15
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-27T19:49:03Z
dc.date.available2023-09-27T19:49:03Z
dc.identifierhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/43379
dc.identifier10.5902/2179378643379
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8942229
dc.descriptionDas über die Grenzen möglicher Erfahrungserkenntnis hinausgehende Denken benötigt einen subjektiven Grund zur Legitimierung seiner Urteile. Dieser liegt nach Kant im Gefühl eines “Vernunftbedürfnisses”, das aber seinerseits (zur Unterscheidung von “un-vernünftigem” Drang) als ein solches begründet werden muss. Hierzu dient die Reklamierung eines besonderen “Recht[s] des Bedürfnisses” der Vernunft, “als eines subjectiven Grundes etwas […] anzunehmen, was sie durch objective Gründe zu wissen sich nicht anmaben darf” [08:137]. Im Unterschied zum Bedürfnis der theoretischen Vernunft und seiner Befriedigung durch blobe Hypothesen (“Urgrund”) ist das praktische Vernunftbedürfnis unbedingt, weil wir hier nicht nur “urtheilen wollen, sondern […] urtheilen müssen” [08:139]. –  Die besonderen Bedingungen dieses “Müssens” – die moralischen “Postulate” – sollen im Folgenden kritisch beleuchtet werden.de-DE
dc.descriptionThinking beyond the limits of possible empirical knowledge requires a subjective reason for legitimizing its judgments. According to Kant, this lies in the feeling of a "need for reason", which for its part (in contrast to "non-rational" urge) must be justified as such. For this purpose is claimed a special "right of the need" of reason, as a “subjective reason to assume something [...] which it may not presume to know by objective reasons" [08:137]. In contrast to the need of theoretical reason and its satisfaction by mere hypotheses ("original reason"), the practical need of reason is unconditional, because here we do not only "want to judge, but must [...] judge" [08:139]. - The special conditions of this "must" - the moral "postulates" - are to be critically examined in the following.en-US
dc.descriptionThinking beyond the limits of possible empirical knowledge requires a subjective reason for legitimizing its judgments. According to Kant, this lies in the feeling of a "need for reason", which for its part (in contrast to "non-rational" urge) must be justified as such. For this purpose is claimed a special "right of the need" of reason, as a “subjective reason to assume something [...] which it may not presume to know by objective reasons" [08:137]. In contrast to the need of theoretical reason and its satisfaction by mere hypotheses ("original reason"), the practical need of reason is unconditional, because here we do not only "want to judge, but must [...] judge" [08:139]. - The special conditions of this "must" - the moral "postulates" - are to be critically examined in the following.es-ES
dc.descriptionThinking beyond the limits of possible empirical knowledge requires a subjective reason for legitimizing its judgments. According to Kant, this lies in the feeling of a "need for reason", which for its part (in contrast to "non-rational" urge) must be justified as such. For this purpose is claimed a special "right of the need" of reason, as a “subjective reason to assume something [...] which it may not presume to know by objective reasons" [08:137]. In contrast to the need of theoretical reason and its satisfaction by mere hypotheses ("original reason"), the practical need of reason is unconditional, because here we do not only "want to judge, but must [...] judge" [08:139]. - The special conditions of this "must" - the moral "postulates" - are to be critically examined in the following.fr-FR
dc.descriptionThinking beyond the limits of possible empirical knowledge requires a subjective reason for legitimizing its judgments. According to Kant, this lies in the feeling of a "need for reason", which for its part (in contrast to "non-rational" urge) must be justified as such. For this purpose is claimed a special "right of the need" of reason, as a “subjective reason to assume something [...] which it may not presume to know by objective reasons" [08:137]. In contrast to the need of theoretical reason and its satisfaction by mere hypotheses ("original reason"), the practical need of reason is unconditional, because here we do not only "want to judge, but must [...] judge" [08:139]. - The special conditions of this "must" - the moral "postulates" - are to be critically examined in the following.it-IT
dc.descriptionPensar além dos limites do possível conhecimento empírico requer uma razão subjetiva para legitimar seus juízos. De acordo com Kant, esta reside no sentimento de uma "necessidade da razão", que, por sua vez (para distingui-la de impulsos "não-racionais"), deve ser justificado como tal. Para isto, é reclamado um especial "direito da necessidade" da razão, como “fundamento subjetivo para supor e admitir algo [...] que ela com fundamento objetivo não pode presumir saber" [08:137]. Ao contrário da necessidade da razão teórica e da sua satisfação por meras hipóteses ("causa originária"), a necessidade prática da razão é incondicional, porque aqui não só "queremos julgar, mas devemos [...] julgar" [08:139]. – A seguir, as condições específicas deste "dever" - os "postulados" morais – serão examinadas criticamente.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/html
dc.languagedeu
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Santa Mariapt-BR
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/43379/pdf
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/43379/html
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2020 Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofiapt-BR
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Bd. 11 Nr. 1 (2020): Dossier Der "Parmenides" Platons + Schopenhauer-Studien; 164 - 172de-DE
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2020): Dossier Plato's "Parmenides" + Schopenhauerian Studies; 164 - 172en-US
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 11 Núm. 1 (2020): Dossier El "Parménides" de Platon + Estudios Schopenhauerianos; 164 - 172es-ES
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 11 No 1 (2020): Dossiê O "Parmênides" de Platão + Estudos Schopenhauerianos; 164 - 172fr-FR
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; V. 11 N. 1 (2020): Dossier Il "Parmenide" di Platone + Studi Schopenhaueriani; 164 - 172it-IT
dc.sourceVoluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 11 n. 1 (2020): Dossiê O "Parmênides" de Platão + Estudos Schopenhauerianos; 164 - 172pt-BR
dc.source2179-3786
dc.subjectVernunftbedürfnisde-DE
dc.subjectSubjektiver Grundde-DE
dc.subjectObjektive Gründede-DE
dc.subjectMoralische Postulatede-DE
dc.subjectNeeds of reasonen-US
dc.subjectSubjective/objective reasonen-US
dc.subjectMoral postulatesen-US
dc.subjectNeeds of reasones-ES
dc.subjectSubjective/objective reasones-ES
dc.subjectMoral postulateses-ES
dc.subjectNeeds of reasonfr-FR
dc.subjectSubjective/objective reasonfr-FR
dc.subjectMoral postulatesfr-FR
dc.subjectNeeds of reasonit-IT
dc.subjectSubjective/objective reasonit-IT
dc.subjectMoral postulatesit-IT
dc.subjectNecessidades da razãopt-BR
dc.subjectFundamento subjetivo/objetivopt-BR
dc.subjectPostulados moraispt-BR
dc.titleZu den Bedürfnissen theoretischer und praktischer Vernunftde-DE
dc.titleOn the needs of theoretical and practical reasonen-US
dc.titleOn the needs of theoretical and practical reasones-ES
dc.titleOn the needs of theoretical and practical reasonfr-FR
dc.titleOn the needs of theoretical and practical reasonit-IT
dc.titleSobre as necessidades da razão teórica e práticapt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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