The present article discusses the open character that Ricœur, in his book Memory, History, Forgetting (2001), keeps to the question of the validity of history as scientific knowledge. The fact that Ricœur does not aim for a consensus that validates historiography, in the epistemological sense, may discourage a historian reader. However, the dissensus that is reflected in the lack of a paradigmatic method, univocal meaning and a fundamental category of historiographical inquiry, in Ricœur, does not condemn historiography to impossibility. Instead, the present text aims to justify the “open” character of historiography, exposed by Ricœur in the work cited here, presenting the need of “crossed perspectives” for the relationship of historiography with the public debate. This discussion leads to the ethical and political implications of historiographic discourse.The present article discusses the open character that Ricœur, in his book Memory, History, Forgetting (2001), keeps to the question of the validity of history as scientific knowledge. The fact that Ricœur does not aim for a consensus that validates historiography, in the epistemological sense, may discourage a historian reader. However, the dissensus that is reflected in the lack of a paradigmatic method, univocal meaning and a fundamental category of historiographical inquiry, in Ricœur, does not condemn historiography to impossibility. Instead, the present text aims to justify the “open” character of historiography, exposed by Ricœur in the work cited here, presenting the need of “crossed perspectives” for the relationship of historiography with the public debate. This discussion leads to the ethical and political implications of historiographic discourse.The present article discusses the open character that Ricœur, in his book Memory, History, Forgetting (2001), keeps to the question of the validity of history as scientific knowledge. The fact that Ricœur does not aim for a consensus that validates historiography, in the epistemological sense, may discourage a historian reader. However, the dissensus that is reflected in the lack of a paradigmatic method, univocal meaning and a fundamental category of historiographical inquiry, in Ricœur, does not condemn historiography to impossibility. Instead, the present text aims to justify the “open” character of historiography, exposed by Ricœur in the work cited here, presenting the need of “crossed perspectives” for the relationship of historiography with the public debate. This discussion leads to the ethical and political implications of historiographic discourse.The present article discusses the open character that Ricœur, in his book Memory, History, Forgetting (2001), keeps to the question of the validity of history as scientific knowledge. The fact that Ricœur does not aim for a consensus that validates historiography, in the epistemological sense, may discourage a historian reader. However, the dissensus that is reflected in the lack of a paradigmatic method, univocal meaning and a fundamental category of historiographical inquiry, in Ricœur, does not condemn historiography to impossibility. Instead, the present text aims to justify the “open” character of historiography, exposed by Ricœur in the work cited here, presenting the need of “crossed perspectives” for the relationship of historiography with the public debate. This discussion leads to the ethical and political implications of historiographic discourse.The present article discusses the open character that Ricœur, in his book Memory, History, Forgetting (2001), keeps to the question of the validity of history as scientific knowledge. The fact that Ricœur does not aim for a consensus that validates historiography, in the epistemological sense, may discourage a historian reader. However, the dissensus that is reflected in the lack of a paradigmatic method, univocal meaning and a fundamental category of historiographical inquiry, in Ricœur, does not condemn historiography to impossibility. Instead, the present text aims to justify the “open” character of historiography, exposed by Ricœur in the work cited here, presenting the need of “crossed perspectives” for the relationship of historiography with the public debate. This discussion leads to the ethical and political implications of historiographic discourse.O presente artigo discute sobre o caráter aberto que Ricœur, em sua obra A memória, a história, o esquecimento (2001), mantém para a questão da validade da historiografia enquanto saber científico. O fato de Ricoeur não objetivar um consenso que valide a historiografia, no sentido epistemológico, pode desanimar um leitor historiador. No entanto, o dissensus que se reflete na falta de um método paradigmático, de um significado unívoco e de uma categoria fundamental da investigação historiográfica, em Ricoeur, não condena a historiografia à impossibilidade. Ao invés disso, o presente texto tem o objetivo de justificar o caráter “aberto” da historiografía, exposto por Ricoeur na obra aqui citada, apresentando a necessidade das “perspectivas cruzadas” para a relação da historiografia com o debate público. Essa discussão desemboca nas implicações éticas e políticas do discurso historiográfico.