How to distinguish memory representations? A historical and critical journey;
How to distinguish memory representations? A historical and critical journey;
How to distinguish memory representations? A historical and critical journey;
How to distinguish memory representations? A historical and critical journey;
Como distinguir representações de memória individuais de longo prazo? Uma jornada histórica e crítica

dc.creatorTrakas, Marina
dc.date2019-12-18
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-27T19:48:48Z
dc.date.available2023-09-27T19:48:48Z
dc.identifierhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/39849
dc.identifier10.5902/2179378639849
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8942184
dc.descriptionMemory is not a unitary phenomenon. Even among the group of long-term individual memory representations (known in the literature as declarative memory) there seems to be a distinction between two kinds of memory: memory of personally experienced events (episodic memory) and memory of facts or knowledge about the world (semantic memory). Although this distinction seems very intuitive, it is not so clear in which characteristic or set of interrelated characteristics lies the difference. In this article, I present the different criteria proposed in the philosophical and scientific literature in order to account for this distinction: (1) the vehicle of representation; (2) the grammar of the verb “to remember”; (3) the cause of the memory; (4) the memory content; and (5) the phenomenology of memory representations. Whereas some criteria seem more plausible than others, I show that all of them are problematic and none of them really fulfill their aim. I then briefly outline a different criterion, the affective criterion, which seems a promising line of research to try to understand the grounds of this distinction.de-DE
dc.descriptionMemory is not a unitary phenomenon. Even among the group of long-term individual memory representations (known in the literature as declarative memory) there seems to be a distinction between two kinds of memory: memory of personally experienced events (episodic memory) and memory of facts or knowledge about the world (semantic memory). Although this distinction seems very intuitive, it is not so clear in which characteristic or set of interrelated characteristics lies the difference. In this article, I present the different criteria proposed in the philosophical and scientific literature in order to account for this distinction: (1) the vehicle of representation; (2) the grammar of the verb “to remember”; (3) the cause of the memory; (4) the memory content; and (5) the phenomenology of memory representations. Whereas some criteria seem more plausible than others, I show that all of them are problematic and none of them really fulfill their aim. I then briefly outline a different criterion, the affective criterion, which seems a promising line of research to try to understand the grounds of this distinction.en-US
dc.descriptionMemory is not a unitary phenomenon. Even among the group of long-term individual memory representations (known in the literature as declarative memory) there seems to be a distinction between two kinds of memory: memory of personally experienced events (episodic memory) and memory of facts or knowledge about the world (semantic memory). Although this distinction seems very intuitive, it is not so clear in which characteristic or set of interrelated characteristics lies the difference. In this article, I present the different criteria proposed in the philosophical and scientific literature in order to account for this distinction: (1) the vehicle of representation; (2) the grammar of the verb “to remember”; (3) the cause of the memory; (4) the memory content; and (5) the phenomenology of memory representations. Whereas some criteria seem more plausible than others, I show that all of them are problematic and none of them really fulfill their aim. I then briefly outline a different criterion, the affective criterion, which seems a promising line of research to try to understand the grounds of this distinction.es-ES
dc.descriptionMemory is not a unitary phenomenon. Even among the group of long-term individual memory representations (known in the literature as declarative memory) there seems to be a distinction between two kinds of memory: memory of personally experienced events (episodic memory) and memory of facts or knowledge about the world (semantic memory). Although this distinction seems very intuitive, it is not so clear in which characteristic or set of interrelated characteristics lies the difference. In this article, I present the different criteria proposed in the philosophical and scientific literature in order to account for this distinction: (1) the vehicle of representation; (2) the grammar of the verb “to remember”; (3) the cause of the memory; (4) the memory content; and (5) the phenomenology of memory representations. Whereas some criteria seem more plausible than others, I show that all of them are problematic and none of them really fulfill their aim. I then briefly outline a different criterion, the affective criterion, which seems a promising line of research to try to understand the grounds of this distinction.fr-FR
dc.descriptionMemory is not a unitary phenomenon. Even among the group of long-term individual memory representations (known in the literature as declarative memory) there seems to be a distinction between two kinds of memory: memory of personally experienced events (episodic memory) and memory of facts or knowledge about the world (semantic memory). Although this distinction seems very intuitive, it is not so clear in which characteristic or set of interrelated characteristics lies the difference. In this article, I present the different criteria proposed in the philosophical and scientific literature in order to account for this distinction: (1) the vehicle of representation; (2) the grammar of the verb “to remember”; (3) the cause of the memory; (4) the memory content; and (5) the phenomenology of memory representations. Whereas some criteria seem more plausible than others, I show that all of them are problematic and none of them really fulfill their aim. I then briefly outline a different criterion, the affective criterion, which seems a promising line of research to try to understand the grounds of this distinction.it-IT
dc.descriptionA memória não é um fenômeno unitário. Mesmo entre o grupo de representações de memória individuais de longo prazo (conhecidas na literatura como memória declarativa), parece haver uma distinção entre dois tipos de memória: memória de eventos experimentados pessoalmente (memória episódica) e memória de fatos ou conhecimentos sobre o mundo (memória semântica). Embora essa distinção pareça muito intuitiva, não é tão claro em qual característica ou conjunto de características inter-relacionadas reside a diferença. Neste artigo, apresento os diferentes critérios propostos na literatura filosófica e científica para dar conta dessa distinção: (1) o veículo de representação; (2) a gramática do verbo “lembrar”; (3) a causa da memória; (4) o conteúdo da memória; e (5) a fenomenologia das representações da memória. Embora alguns critérios pareçam mais plausíveis que outros, mostro que todos são problemáticos e nenhum deles realmente cumpre seu objetivo. Em seguida, descrevo brevemente um critério diferente, o critério afetivo, que parece uma linha de pesquisa promissora para tentar entender os fundamentos dessa distinção.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/html
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Santa Mariapt-BR
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/39849/pdf
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/39849/html
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2019 Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofiapt-BR
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Bd. 10 Nr. 3 (2019): Dossier Philosophien des Gedächtnis + Schopenhauer-Studien; 53 - 86de-DE
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 10 No. 3 (2019): Dossier Philosophies of Memory + Schopenhauerian Studies; 53 - 86en-US
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 10 Núm. 3 (2019): Dossier Philosophies of Memory + Schopenhauerian Studies; 53 - 86es-ES
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 10 No 3 (2019): Dossiê Filosofias da Memória + Estudos Schopenhaurianos; 53 - 86fr-FR
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; V. 10 N. 3 (2019): Dossier Filosofie della memoria + Studi Schopenhaueriani; 53 - 86it-IT
dc.sourceVoluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 10 n. 3 (2019): Dossiê Filosofias da Memória + Estudos Schopenhaurianos; 53 - 86pt-BR
dc.source2179-3786
dc.subjectKinds of memoryde-DE
dc.subjectDeclarative memoryde-DE
dc.subjectEpisodic memoryde-DE
dc.subjectSemantic memoryde-DE
dc.subjectAutobiographical memoryde-DE
dc.subjectKinds of memoryen-US
dc.subjectDeclarative memoryen-US
dc.subjectEpisodic memoryen-US
dc.subjectSemantic memoryen-US
dc.subjectAutobiographical memoryen-US
dc.subjectKinds of memoryes-ES
dc.subjectDeclarative memoryes-ES
dc.subjectEpisodic memoryes-ES
dc.subjectSemantic memoryes-ES
dc.subjectAutobiographical memoryes-ES
dc.subjectKinds of memoryfr-FR
dc.subjectDeclarative memoryfr-FR
dc.subjectEpisodic memoryfr-FR
dc.subjectSemantic memoryfr-FR
dc.subjectAutobiographical memoryfr-FR
dc.subjectKinds of memoryit-IT
dc.subjectDeclarative memoryit-IT
dc.subjectEpisodic memoryit-IT
dc.subjectSemantic memoryit-IT
dc.subjectAutobiographical memoryit-IT
dc.subjectTipos de memóriapt-BR
dc.subjectMemória declarativapt-BR
dc.subjectMemória episódicapt-BR
dc.subjectMemória semânticapt-BR
dc.subjectMemória autobiográficapt-BR
dc.titleHow to distinguish memory representations? A historical and critical journeyde-DE
dc.titleHow to distinguish memory representations? A historical and critical journeyen-US
dc.titleHow to distinguish memory representations? A historical and critical journeyes-ES
dc.titleHow to distinguish memory representations? A historical and critical journeyfr-FR
dc.titleHow to distinguish memory representations? A historical and critical journeyit-IT
dc.titleComo distinguir representações de memória individuais de longo prazo? Uma jornada histórica e críticapt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


Este ítem pertenece a la siguiente institución