O giro ontológico da verdade: de Heidegger à fenomenologia material de Michel Henry

Abstract

The concept of truth permeates Heidegger's thought. In its fundamental ontology it receives the meaning of discovery and, in a special sense, of openness. As an ontological concept, it is always articulated in relation to being. Delimited to the period of Being and Time, Heidegger intends to designate the identification event in which an entity is normatively individuated according to pre-established criteria in a certain mode of being. In the foreground, the concept is relative to the discovery of entities with such being; in the second, it designates the event of opening the dimension of meaning. From then on the concept of Truth, for phenomenology in general, determines the phenomenalization. Michel Henry proposes an inversion in the methodological conception of phenomenology in search of what it means to be a pure phenomenality. With this, he returns to Cartesian subjectivity to find the firm foundation of the being of the cogito. His phenomenology, which seeks to highlight the relations of dependence between formal structures, claims in the primitive impression a self-giving and an original phenomenon: the phenomenalization of phenomenality. For Henry, this pure appearing is the character of the most original truth, which, immanently, guarantees the experience of reality in a transcendent truth. The objective of this work is to present a new beginning in the relationship between being and truth, where ontology is also possible as phenomenology, but because the dynamics of importance between being and appearing has been reversed. The elucidation of this problem is based on the exposition of two aspects pertinent to the theme in the theory of both authors, as well as on the reconstruction of the henryian interpretation of fundamental ontology and its proposal of subversion of the thinking of Heidegger and Husserl. The general objective of this research is to thematize, under a rotating metaphor, about the dependence between the truth of hermeneutic phenomenology and the truth of material phenomenology, therefore the methodological consequences of this maneuver.