Articulo
The Subject Before The Law Consciousness Of The Moral Law And Faktum Of Reason In Kant
TOPICOS-REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA
Registro en:
1151001
1151001
Autor
González-Vallejos, Miguel
Molina-Canto, Eduardo Andrés
Institución
Resumen
In this work, we shall analyze two aspects regarding what Kant considers the fundamental principle of practical reason. First, we shall try to show that the fundamental practical principle necessarily implies a sort of suspension of any subjective principle of action, that is, of the guiding function proper to maxims. This would be a first moment of negativity inherent to the consciousness of the Moral law within us. Secondly, we shall also attempt to show that the consciousness of this law involves the recognition of our original inadequacy with respect to it, and that this inadequacy is necessarily felt as a peculiar type of pain, a negative feeling as unique and original as it is unique and original the fact of the law's consciousness. This would be a second moment of negativity, this time related to the agent's own practical identity. Keywords. Author Keywords:Kant; Faktum of reason; moral feeling; categorical imperative. KeyWords Plus:FACT Regular 2015 FONDECYT FONDECYT