It is argued, from a general perspective, that “Cognitive Processes” is an expression that contributes to the present state of confusion in psychology, because, in its particular use in Cognitive Psychology, this expression has been used as a substitute of psychological phenomena or events. The concept of process has been promoted by several trends in theoretical and applied psychology. We refer to Vigotsky and Luria who used the word ‘meaning superior psychological functions or behavior’. But we point out some authors identifies within Cognitive Psychology and the Information Processing Psychologies that have prometed the use of process, explicitly using the metaphor of the commutative processes of the computer machine. From a linguistic point of view, the concept of process means steps in a developing phenomenon and acts as a knowledge category. In accordance with this, it is shown that the main concepts qualified as processes like- Attention, Perception, Intelligence, Memory and Conscience- are not really processes. They are concepts that have to be included in state, action or disposition categories but not in the category of processes. From a scientific point of view, it seems clear that the concept of processes has been used metaphorically to refer to psychological phenomena or events and that the cognitive users of this concept have failed because they have confused the interpretative vehicle with  the topic studied. A general consideration about psychological need of producing a general definition and functional taxonomy of psychological events is made and also a reference to Interbehavioral Psychology as promoter of these goals.La idea básica de este escrito es que la palabra «proceso» proviene de fuentes diversas, pero se ha convertido en un sucedáneo de eventos o fenómenos psicológicos. En contra de ello se argumenta, primero, que la mayoría de conceptos que son cualificados de procesos no lo son, desde un punto de vista lingüístico. Segundo, que desde un punto de vista científico, aquella palabra puede haber actuado como un vehículo interpretativo de lo que son los fenómenos psicológicos, pero ha acabado solapando el mismo objeto de estudio de la psicología. Es más, este solapamiento se ha convertido en propuesta de substitución con la adopción del símil maquinal o computacional de proceso. Se concluye afirmando que si no se definen los fenómenos psicológicos, mal se pueden definir sus procesos.