Some Skinnerian options about sciencie are first presented: pragmatism in cience and the study of the scientists behavior; the technical aspects of science, with respect to the control and prediction of behavior; the formulation and function of scientific laws. Then, among these topics, two basic lines are shown of interest: Skinner´s view of causality, and his conceptions about explanation and scientific theories. Some recent studies (Chiesa, 1994; Ringen, 1999: Smith, 1986) have examined these two aspects of Skinnerian radical behaviorism. The present work review their arguments, in each case, before concluding on two remarks: firstly, considering the two last centuries, theoretical background of the Skinnerian determinism is not a mechanistic one; behavior is often globally considered, but operant mechanism seems also to operate at a molecular level; a temporal gap remains between  behavior and consequence, not always explicitly justified; the equivalence between description and explanation might be discussed; and the rejection of certain forms of theories is not uniquely logical. All these points can lead to different philosophical positions. The lack of originality or inaccuracy of some Skinnerian options implies to pursue further investigations, in order to defend the building of a proper Skinnerian radical behaviorist epistemology. We propose to support this temporary conclusion by future research.Après une présentation des options skinnériennes vis-à-vis de la science en général, deux aspects particuliers sont considérés: la causalité d'une part, l'explication et les théories scientifiques d'autre part. Dans la lignée de travaux récents, une mise en perspective des positions de Skinner donne lieu à deux conclusions provisoires: premièrement, l'arrière-plan théorique de ses analyses se résume clairement à quelques théoriciens anglo-saxons de la science moderne; deuxièmement, ses conceptions de la causalité et de l'explication sont loin d'être distinctes et distinguables. Cet article, concernant l'opportunité d'accorder ou non le statut d'épistémologie originale au béhaviorisme radical skinnérien, aboutit donc-sur une position mitigée, mais propose l'étayage éventuel de cette thèse par des recherches subséquentes.