Article (Journal/Review)
Banco Nacional: jogo de Ponzi, PROER e FCVS
Date
2008-03-01Registration in:
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy. Editora 34, v. 28, n. 1, p. 97-115, 2008.
0101-3157
10.1590/S0101-31572008000100005
S0101-31572008000100005.pdf
S0101-31572008000100005
Author
Barbosa, Fernando de Holanda
Institutions
Abstract
Banco Nacional: Ponzi game, PROER and FCVS. This paper analyses the causes of the failure of Banco Nacional and the resolution method adopted by the Brazilian central bank. The program (PROER) designed by the central bank and its legal framework allowed the failed bank to buydefaulted securities , financed by the central bank, and to use them as borrowing collateral. The paper also analyses the private and social costs of this bank failure.