Banco Nacional: jogo de Ponzi, PROER e FCVS

dc.contributorFundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
dc.creatorBarbosa, Fernando de Holanda
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-06T13:19:33Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-03T20:36:33Z
dc.date.available2018-04-06T13:19:33Z
dc.date.available2022-11-03T20:36:33Z
dc.date.created2018-04-06T13:19:33Z
dc.date.issued2008-03-01
dc.identifierBrazilian Journal of Political Economy. Editora 34, v. 28, n. 1, p. 97-115, 2008.
dc.identifier0101-3157
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10438/21782
dc.identifier10.1590/S0101-31572008000100005
dc.identifierS0101-31572008000100005.pdf
dc.identifierS0101-31572008000100005
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5041578
dc.description.abstractBanco Nacional: Ponzi game, PROER and FCVS. This paper analyses the causes of the failure of Banco Nacional and the resolution method adopted by the Brazilian central bank. The program (PROER) designed by the central bank and its legal framework allowed the failed bank to buydefaulted securities , financed by the central bank, and to use them as borrowing collateral. The paper also analyses the private and social costs of this bank failure.
dc.languagepor
dc.publisherEditora 34
dc.relationBrazilian Journal of Political Economy
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.sourceSciELO
dc.subjectBank failure
dc.subjectResolution method
dc.subjectCentral Bank intervention in failing banks
dc.titleBanco Nacional: jogo de Ponzi, PROER e FCVS
dc.typeArticle (Journal/Review)


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