This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent ...

Shugart and Carey (1992) posit that presidential democracies in which legislators have a parochial focus of representation are electorally inefficient because voters are not offered highly identifiable choices over national ...

We study the interaction between social and economic incentives in determining the level of corruption. Using social rewards as incentives for civil servants may help to reduce corruption. In our model, a decrease in ...

We study the political incentives shaping governments’ decisions to seek assistance from a lender of last resort. We propose that re-elected incumbents are more reluctant than newly elected governments to request assistance, ...

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public ...

Esta tese é composta por três ensaios em economia política. No primeiro ensaio, eu investigo o impacto da introdução de um mecanismo de incentivo, direcionado a prefeitos brasileiros, que visava melhorar o desempenho de ...