Artículos de revistas
Social Status and Corruption
Fecha
2013-10Registro en:
Galiani, Sebastian; Weinschelbaum, Federico; Social Status and Corruption; Nordic Journal of Political Economy; Nordic Journal of Political Economy; 38; 10-2013; 1-18
0345-8555
CONICET Digital
CONICET
Autor
Galiani, Sebastian
Weinschelbaum, Federico
Resumen
We study the interaction between social and economic incentives in determining the level of corruption. Using social rewards as incentives for civil servants may help to reduce corruption. In our model, a decrease in corruption produces an externality that reduces the cost of hiring civil servants. In particular, it makes wage schemes which avert corruption (efficiency wages) cheaper. We show that the existence of this externality reduces the ?optimal? level of corruption in a society, the greater the power of social status, the lower the level of corruption.