dc.creator | Céspedes, Esteban | |
dc.date | 2024-04-23T15:37:57Z | |
dc.date | 2024-04-23T15:37:57Z | |
dc.date | 2024 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-05-02T20:32:29Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-05-02T20:32:29Z | |
dc.identifier | http://repositorio.ucm.cl/handle/ucm/5340 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/9275524 | |
dc.description | As a non-representationalist form of integrating methodological naturalism with ontological naturalism, this work proposes a distinction between phenomenic and rational intuitions. Since this is not a static distinction, it offers a way of observing in which sense the apparent circularity between mental and theoretical representations is not a vicious one. The argument’s plausibility will have to be reinforced through considerations about the unstability of ontologies and about how to conceive conflicting intuitions. | |
dc.language | en | |
dc.rights | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile | |
dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ | |
dc.source | Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, (24), 25-43 | |
dc.subject | Realism | |
dc.subject | Representation | |
dc.subject | Phenomenon | |
dc.subject | Naturalism | |
dc.subject | Ontology | |
dc.title | Open naturalism and two types of intuition | |
dc.type | Article | |