dc.creatorCéspedes, Esteban
dc.date2024-04-23T15:37:57Z
dc.date2024-04-23T15:37:57Z
dc.date2024
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-02T20:32:29Z
dc.date.available2024-05-02T20:32:29Z
dc.identifierhttp://repositorio.ucm.cl/handle/ucm/5340
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/9275524
dc.descriptionAs a non-representationalist form of integrating methodological naturalism with ontological naturalism, this work proposes a distinction between phenomenic and rational intuitions. Since this is not a static distinction, it offers a way of observing in which sense the apparent circularity between mental and theoretical representations is not a vicious one. The argument’s plausibility will have to be reinforced through considerations about the unstability of ontologies and about how to conceive conflicting intuitions.
dc.languageen
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.sourceRevista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, (24), 25-43
dc.subjectRealism
dc.subjectRepresentation
dc.subjectPhenomenon
dc.subjectNaturalism
dc.subjectOntology
dc.titleOpen naturalism and two types of intuition
dc.typeArticle


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