The ontological importance of being a perceptual attitude

dc.creatorSanhueza Rodríguez, Sebastián
dc.date2023-05-16T15:03:47Z
dc.date2023-05-16T15:03:47Z
dc.date2020
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-02T20:31:17Z
dc.date.available2024-05-02T20:31:17Z
dc.identifierhttp://repositorio.ucm.cl/handle/ucm/4797
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/9275037
dc.descriptionCurrent philosophical debates about perception have largely ignored questions concerning the ontological structure of perceptual experience, so as to focus on its intentional and phenomenological character. To illustrate and put pressure on this tendency, I revisit the controversy between doxastic views of perception and Gareth Evans’s objection from over-intellectualization. I suggest that classic versions of the doxastic view are to a good extent driven by an ontological characterization of perceptual attitudes as nonfactive states or dispositions, not by a cognitively complex picture of perceptual content. Conceived along these lines, the doxastic view unveils an ontologically significant story of perceptual experience for at least two reasons: on the one hand, that characterization avoids the line of reasoning leading up to sense-datum theories of perception; and, on the other, it bears on recent discussions about the temporal structure of perceptual experience. Although I do not endorse the doxastic view, my goal is to highlight the importance of the relatively neglected ontological motivations thus driving that kind of account.
dc.languageen
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.sourceOrganon F, 27(1), 2-28
dc.subjectNonfactivity
dc.subjectPerceptual attitudes
dc.subjectProcesses
dc.subjectRelational-ism
dc.subjectRepresentationalism
dc.subjectStates
dc.titleThe ontological importance of being a perceptual attitude
dc.typeArticle


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