FISCAL CONSERVATISM AS A RESPONSE TO THE DEBT CRISIS

dc.creatorLABAN, R
dc.creatorSTURZENEGGER, F
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-10T12:05:31Z
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-02T18:23:59Z
dc.date.available2024-01-10T12:05:31Z
dc.date.available2024-05-02T18:23:59Z
dc.date.created2024-01-10T12:05:31Z
dc.date.issued1994
dc.identifier10.1016/0304-3878(94)90035-3
dc.identifier0304-3878
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3878(94)90035-3
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/76023
dc.identifierWOS:A1994QV05100007
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/9270269
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we develop a model in which social conflict and adjustment costs induce delayed inflation stabilization. We show that the longer this delay is the less demanding are the conditions that some groups will accept in order to stabilize. In the context of the Latin American debt crisis, our model gives a rationale for the time lag between the outset of the crisis and the implementation of reform programs as well as for the strongly conservative nature of those that are currently being implemented.
dc.languageen
dc.publisherELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
dc.rightsregistro bibliográfico
dc.subjectINFLATION
dc.subjectSTABILIZATION
dc.subjectREFORM
dc.subjectDEBT CRISIS
dc.titleFISCAL CONSERVATISM AS A RESPONSE TO THE DEBT CRISIS
dc.typeartículo


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