dc.creatorPatricia Jurfest, Sonia
dc.creatorParedes, Ricardo D.
dc.creatorRiutort, Julio
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-10T12:09:09Z
dc.date.available2024-01-10T12:09:09Z
dc.date.created2024-01-10T12:09:09Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier0041-3011
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/76463
dc.identifierWOS:000364728600004
dc.description.abstractWe review the corporate takeover regulation in place in the world and find evidence that it is converging from the Market Rule (MR) towards the Equal Opportunity Rule (EOR). The literature on the economic rationale of these rules shows that the Private Benefits of Control (PBC) affect control changes; in particular, the EOR has the potential to preclude inefficient transfers but also to slow down the overall activity of the corporate control market. Jurfest, Paredes and Riutort (2015) proposes a model to estimate the PBC under the different regulations, nesting as a special case the well-known model of Block Premium Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Dyck and Zingales (2004). In this paper we illustrate the applicability and consistency of this model to estimate the PBC under the different regulatory regimes in place and under alternative distributions of the bargaining power of the seller of control.
dc.languagees
dc.publisherFONDO CULTURA ECONOMICA
dc.rightsregistro bibliográfico
dc.subjectSHARE-ONE VOTE
dc.subjectCORPORATE-CONTROL
dc.subjectVOTING-RIGHTS
dc.subjectMARKET
dc.subjectGOVERNANCE
dc.subjectSHAREHOLDERS
dc.subjectEFFICIENT
dc.subjectSALES
dc.subjectRULE
dc.titleTAKEOVERS IN THE WORLD AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL UNDER THE VARIOUS REGULATIONS IN FORCE
dc.typeartículo


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