Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment

dc.creatorRodriguez Sickert, Carlos
dc.creatorGuzman, Ricardo Andres
dc.creatorCardenas, Juan Camilo
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-10T12:06:06Z
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-02T17:13:29Z
dc.date.available2024-01-10T12:06:06Z
dc.date.available2024-05-02T17:13:29Z
dc.date.created2024-01-10T12:06:06Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.004
dc.identifier1879-1751
dc.identifier0167-2681
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.004
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/76114
dc.identifierWOS:000257589900016
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/9267809
dc.description.abstractWe model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting Our model to experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.languageen
dc.publisherELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectexperimental economics
dc.subjectsocial norms
dc.subjectinternalization of preferences
dc.subjectlearning
dc.subjectcommon pool resource games
dc.subjectPUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTS
dc.subjectCOOPERATION
dc.titleInstitutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment
dc.typeartículo


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