Dualismo Socrático

dc.creatorSosa, Javier Echeñique
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-30T23:28:30Z
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-02T14:50:40Z
dc.date.available2022-06-30T23:28:30Z
dc.date.available2024-05-02T14:50:40Z
dc.date.created2022-06-30T23:28:30Z
dc.date.issued2018-11
dc.identifierRevista de Filosofia (Chile) Volume 74, Pages 55 - 72November 2018
dc.identifier00348236
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.unab.cl/xmlui/handle/ria/23104
dc.identifier10.4067/s0718-43602018000100055
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/9259284
dc.description.abstractThe purpose of this article is to show, against the dominant interpretations, that earlier in his career Plato saw the need to postulate the survival of the soul as an independent locus of benefit and harm, in order to complete his defense of Socratic ethics - in particular, of the principle of Sovereignty of Virtue, crucial to earlier dialogues such as Apology, Crito, and Gorgias. The dualism resulting from this postulate I call 'socratic dualism', distinct from the mature dualism developed by Plato in the Phaedo. © 2018 Universidad de Chile. All rights reserved.
dc.languagees
dc.publisherUniversidad de Chile
dc.subjectPlato
dc.subjectAristotle
dc.subjectPrsotagora
dc.subjectEthics
dc.subjectSurvival
dc.titleDualismo Socrático
dc.typeArtículo


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