Theories of remembering: causalism, simulationism, and functionalism

Theories of remembering: causalism, simulationism, and functionalism;
Theories of remembering: causalism, simulationism, and functionalism;
Theories of remembering: causalism, simulationism, and functionalism;
Theories of remembering: causalism, simulationism, and functionalism;
Teorias sobre o lembrar: causalismo, simulacionismo e funcionalismo

dc.creatorSant'Anna, André Rosolem
dc.creatorMichaelian, Kourken
dc.date2019-12-18
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-27T19:48:57Z
dc.date.available2023-09-27T19:48:57Z
dc.identifierhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/40445
dc.identifier10.5902/2179378640445
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8942209
dc.descriptionWhat is it to remember? When can we say that a subject remembers an event from the past? These are two central questions in philosophy of memory, an area that has witnessed a rapid expansion in the past few years. For almost fifty years, the causal theory of memory, initially proposed by Martin and Deutscher (1966), dominated the attempts to answer the two initial questions. More recently, however, the causal theory has been widely criticized, which has motivated philosophers to develop two new theories of the nature of remembering: the simulation theory and the functionalist theory. In this paper, we discuss these three theories in more detail with the goal of clarifying their commitments, as well as their motivations and problems.de-DE
dc.descriptionWhat is it to remember? When can we say that a subject remembers an event from the past? These are two central questions in philosophy of memory, an area that has witnessed a rapid expansion in the past few years. For almost fifty years, the causal theory of memory, initially proposed by Martin and Deutscher (1966), dominated the attempts to answer the two initial questions. More recently, however, the causal theory has been widely criticized, which has motivated philosophers to develop two new theories of the nature of remembering: the simulation theory and the functionalist theory. In this paper, we discuss these three theories in more detail with the goal of clarifying their commitments, as well as their motivations and problems.en-US
dc.descriptionWhat is it to remember? When can we say that a subject remembers an event from the past? These are two central questions in philosophy of memory, an area that has witnessed a rapid expansion in the past few years. For almost fifty years, the causal theory of memory, initially proposed by Martin and Deutscher (1966), dominated the attempts to answer the two initial questions. More recently, however, the causal theory has been widely criticized, which has motivated philosophers to develop two new theories of the nature of remembering: the simulation theory and the functionalist theory. In this paper, we discuss these three theories in more detail with the goal of clarifying their commitments, as well as their motivations and problems.es-ES
dc.descriptionWhat is it to remember? When can we say that a subject remembers an event from the past? These are two central questions in philosophy of memory, an area that has witnessed a rapid expansion in the past few years. For almost fifty years, the causal theory of memory, initially proposed by Martin and Deutscher (1966), dominated the attempts to answer the two initial questions. More recently, however, the causal theory has been widely criticized, which has motivated philosophers to develop two new theories of the nature of remembering: the simulation theory and the functionalist theory. In this paper, we discuss these three theories in more detail with the goal of clarifying their commitments, as well as their motivations and problems.fr-FR
dc.descriptionWhat is it to remember? When can we say that a subject remembers an event from the past? These are two central questions in philosophy of memory, an area that has witnessed a rapid expansion in the past few years. For almost fifty years, the causal theory of memory, initially proposed by Martin and Deutscher (1966), dominated the attempts to answer the two initial questions. More recently, however, the causal theory has been widely criticized, which has motivated philosophers to develop two new theories of the nature of remembering: the simulation theory and the functionalist theory. In this paper, we discuss these three theories in more detail with the goal of clarifying their commitments, as well as their motivations and problems.it-IT
dc.descriptionO que é o lembrar? Quando podemos dizer que um sujeito lembra um evento do passado? Essas são duas questões centrais na filosofia da memória, uma área que vem experimentando uma rápida expansão nos últimos anos. Por quase meio século, a teoria causal da memória, inicialmente proposta por Martin e Deutscher (1966), dominou o debate sobre como devemos responder às duas questões iniciais. Mais recentemente, no entanto, a teoria causal se tornou alvo de duras críticas, o que motivou os filósofos da memória a desenvolverem duas novas teorias sobre o lembrar: a teoria simulacionista e a teoria funcionalista. Neste artigo, exploramos essas teorias em mais detalhes com o objetivo de tornar mais claro quais são seus comprometimentos, assim como suas vantagens e desvantagens.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/html
dc.languagepor
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Santa Mariapt-BR
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/40445/pdf
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/40445/html
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2019 Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofiapt-BR
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Bd. 10 Nr. 3 (2019): Dossier Philosophien des Gedächtnis + Schopenhauer-Studien; 8 - 36de-DE
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 10 No. 3 (2019): Dossier Philosophies of Memory + Schopenhauerian Studies; 8 - 36en-US
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 10 Núm. 3 (2019): Dossier Philosophies of Memory + Schopenhauerian Studies; 8 - 36es-ES
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 10 No 3 (2019): Dossiê Filosofias da Memória + Estudos Schopenhaurianos; 8 - 36fr-FR
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; V. 10 N. 3 (2019): Dossier Filosofie della memoria + Studi Schopenhaueriani; 8 - 36it-IT
dc.sourceVoluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 10 n. 3 (2019): Dossiê Filosofias da Memória + Estudos Schopenhaurianos; 8 - 36pt-BR
dc.source2179-3786
dc.subjectRememberingde-DE
dc.subjectMemoryde-DE
dc.subjectCausalismde-DE
dc.subjectSimulationismde-DE
dc.subjectFunctionalismde-DE
dc.subjectRememberingen-US
dc.subjectMemoryen-US
dc.subjectCausalismen-US
dc.subjectSimulationismen-US
dc.subjectFunctionalismen-US
dc.subjectRememberinges-ES
dc.subjectMemoryes-ES
dc.subjectCausalismes-ES
dc.subjectSimulationismes-ES
dc.subjectFunctionalismes-ES
dc.subjectRememberingfr-FR
dc.subjectMemoryfr-FR
dc.subjectCausalismfr-FR
dc.subjectSimulationismfr-FR
dc.subjectFunctionalismfr-FR
dc.subjectRememberingit-IT
dc.subjectMemoryit-IT
dc.subjectCausalismit-IT
dc.subjectSimulationismit-IT
dc.subjectFunctionalismit-IT
dc.subjectLembrarpt-BR
dc.subjectMemóriapt-BR
dc.subjectCausalismopt-BR
dc.subjectSimulacionismopt-BR
dc.subjectFuncionalismopt-BR
dc.titleTheories of remembering: causalism, simulationism, and functionalismde-DE
dc.titleTheories of remembering: causalism, simulationism, and functionalismen-US
dc.titleTheories of remembering: causalism, simulationism, and functionalismes-ES
dc.titleTheories of remembering: causalism, simulationism, and functionalismfr-FR
dc.titleTheories of remembering: causalism, simulationism, and functionalismit-IT
dc.titleTeorias sobre o lembrar: causalismo, simulacionismo e funcionalismopt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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