Psychogenic amnesia: implications for diachronic sense of self

Psychogenic amnesia: implications for diachronic sense of self;
Psychogenic amnesia: implications for diachronic sense of self;
Psychogenic amnesia: implications for diachronic sense of self;
Psychogenic amnesia: implications for diachronic sense of self;
Amnésia psicogênica: implicações para o senso de si mesmo diacrônico

dc.creatorMarques, Beatriz Sorrentino
dc.date2019-12-18
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-27T19:48:55Z
dc.date.available2023-09-27T19:48:55Z
dc.identifierhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/40389
dc.identifier10.5902/2179378640389
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8942205
dc.descriptionTraditionally the issue of personal identity has considered as the question about what makes one the same across time. Recently though, attention to one’s own phenomenal experience has brought a new perspective to the debate. In light of this change of perspective, Klein suggests that individuals with retrograde episodic amnesia retain a notion of who they are, as well as having sense of continuity. He, therefore, argues that episodic memory is not necessary for a diachronic sense of self. I challenge Klein’s conclusion by pointing out that there are more extreme kinds of amnesia—psychogenic amnesia—that seem problematic to his proposal that sense of continuity is enough for a diachronic sense of self. This is the case because some instances of psychogenic amnesia are cases of dissociative amnesia, which show that having continuous conscious experience does not solve the issue.de-DE
dc.descriptionTraditionally the issue of personal identity has considered as the question about what makes one the same across time. Recently though, attention to one’s own phenomenal experience has brought a new perspective to the debate. In light of this change of perspective, Klein suggests that individuals with retrograde episodic amnesia retain a notion of who they are, as well as having sense of continuity. He, therefore, argues that episodic memory is not necessary for a diachronic sense of self. I challenge Klein’s conclusion by pointing out that there are more extreme kinds of amnesia—psychogenic amnesia—that seem problematic to his proposal that sense of continuity is enough for a diachronic sense of self. This is the case because some instances of psychogenic amnesia are cases of dissociative amnesia, which show that having continuous conscious experience does not solve the issue.en-US
dc.descriptionTraditionally the issue of personal identity has considered as the question about what makes one the same across time. Recently though, attention to one’s own phenomenal experience has brought a new perspective to the debate. In light of this change of perspective, Klein suggests that individuals with retrograde episodic amnesia retain a notion of who they are, as well as having sense of continuity. He, therefore, argues that episodic memory is not necessary for a diachronic sense of self. I challenge Klein’s conclusion by pointing out that there are more extreme kinds of amnesia—psychogenic amnesia—that seem problematic to his proposal that sense of continuity is enough for a diachronic sense of self. This is the case because some instances of psychogenic amnesia are cases of dissociative amnesia, which show that having continuous conscious experience does not solve the issue.es-ES
dc.descriptionTraditionally the issue of personal identity has considered as the question about what makes one the same across time. Recently though, attention to one’s own phenomenal experience has brought a new perspective to the debate. In light of this change of perspective, Klein suggests that individuals with retrograde episodic amnesia retain a notion of who they are, as well as having sense of continuity. He, therefore, argues that episodic memory is not necessary for a diachronic sense of self. I challenge Klein’s conclusion by pointing out that there are more extreme kinds of amnesia—psychogenic amnesia—that seem problematic to his proposal that sense of continuity is enough for a diachronic sense of self. This is the case because some instances of psychogenic amnesia are cases of dissociative amnesia, which show that having continuous conscious experience does not solve the issue.fr-FR
dc.descriptionTraditionally the issue of personal identity has considered as the question about what makes one the same across time. Recently though, attention to one’s own phenomenal experience has brought a new perspective to the debate. In light of this change of perspective, Klein suggests that individuals with retrograde episodic amnesia retain a notion of who they are, as well as having sense of continuity. He, therefore, argues that episodic memory is not necessary for a diachronic sense of self. I challenge Klein’s conclusion by pointing out that there are more extreme kinds of amnesia—psychogenic amnesia—that seem problematic to his proposal that sense of continuity is enough for a diachronic sense of self. This is the case because some instances of psychogenic amnesia are cases of dissociative amnesia, which show that having continuous conscious experience does not solve the issue.it-IT
dc.descriptionTradicionalmente, a questão da identidade pessoal é considerada a questão a respeito ao que faz uma pessoa ser a mesma ao longo do tempo. Recentemente, porém, atenção à experiência fenomênica trouxe uma nova perspectiva ao debate. À luz dessa mudança de perspectiva, Klein sugere que indivíduos com amnésia episódica retrógrada retêm uma noção de quem são, além de terem senso de continuidade. Ele, portanto, argumenta que a memória episódica não é necessária para se ter sensação de si mesmo diacrônica. Desafiamos a conclusão de Klein apontando que existem tipos mais extremos de amnésia—amnésia psicogênica—que parecem problemáticos à sua proposta de que o senso de continuidade é suficiente para se ter sensação de si mesmo diacrônico. Esse é o caso, porque alguns exemplos de amnésia psicogênica são casos de amnésia dissociativa, que mostram que ter uma experiência consciente contínua não resolve o problema.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/html
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Santa Mariapt-BR
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/40389/pdf
dc.relationhttps://periodicos.ufsm.br/voluntas/article/view/40389/html
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2019 Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofiapt-BR
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Bd. 10 Nr. 3 (2019): Dossier Philosophien des Gedächtnis + Schopenhauer-Studien; 129 - 149de-DE
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 10 No. 3 (2019): Dossier Philosophies of Memory + Schopenhauerian Studies; 129 - 149en-US
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 10 Núm. 3 (2019): Dossier Philosophies of Memory + Schopenhauerian Studies; 129 - 149es-ES
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 10 No 3 (2019): Dossiê Filosofias da Memória + Estudos Schopenhaurianos; 129 - 149fr-FR
dc.sourceVoluntas: International Journal of Philosophy; V. 10 N. 3 (2019): Dossier Filosofie della memoria + Studi Schopenhaueriani; 129 - 149it-IT
dc.sourceVoluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 10 n. 3 (2019): Dossiê Filosofias da Memória + Estudos Schopenhaurianos; 129 - 149pt-BR
dc.source2179-3786
dc.subjectEpisodic Memoryde-DE
dc.subjectDiachronic Sense of Selfde-DE
dc.subjectDissociationde-DE
dc.subjectEpisodic Memoryen-US
dc.subjectDiachronic Sense of Selfen-US
dc.subjectDissociationen-US
dc.subjectEpisodic Memoryes-ES
dc.subjectDiachronic Sense of Selfes-ES
dc.subjectDissociationes-ES
dc.subjectEpisodic Memoryfr-FR
dc.subjectDiachronic Sense of Selffr-FR
dc.subjectDissociationfr-FR
dc.subjectEpisodic Memoryit-IT
dc.subjectDiachronic Sense of Selfit-IT
dc.subjectDissociationit-IT
dc.subjectMemória Episódicapt-BR
dc.subjectSensação de Si Mesmo Diacrônicopt-BR
dc.subjectDissociaçãopt-BR
dc.titlePsychogenic amnesia: implications for diachronic sense of selfde-DE
dc.titlePsychogenic amnesia: implications for diachronic sense of selfen-US
dc.titlePsychogenic amnesia: implications for diachronic sense of selfes-ES
dc.titlePsychogenic amnesia: implications for diachronic sense of selffr-FR
dc.titlePsychogenic amnesia: implications for diachronic sense of selfit-IT
dc.titleAmnésia psicogênica: implicações para o senso de si mesmo diacrônicopt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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