Memórias autobiográficas: uma proposta de ressignificação

Abstract

The present work presents empirically based reasons to defend that: (i) there is a problem of conceptual ambiguity related to the concept of “autobiographical memories”; (ii) this problem is related mainly to a view that approximates the concept of “autobiographical memories” and the concept of “episodic memories”; (iii) that problem results from a largely loose view regarding the meaning of an “autobiography”; and (iv) that problem can be simply solved by the proposition of a way to restrict the notion of autobiography underlying to the concept of “autobiographical memories”. To accomplish this, in chapter 2, I will present concepts related to subjective temporality of episodic memories, which will be utilized for my argumentation of the difference in phenomenology between episodic memories and autobiographical memories. And in chapter 4, I put forward two arguments to defend, respectively, the difference in phenomenology and self-reference between episodic memories, semantic memories, and autobiographical memories. Furthermore, I put in practice a prescriptive metaphysical task, in which I propose the conceptual amelioration of the concept of “autobiographical memories” by the restriction of the meaning of “autobiography”, in a way of avoiding the conceptual clarity problems of the term, which can be seen throughout the literature. In chapter 4, I will treat about the self and the problem of personal identity. I believe that we can analyze in which way my resignification proposal of “autobiographical memories” can help us better understand questions related to personal identity.