dc.contributorSouza, Adriano Mendonça
dc.contributorhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/5271075797851198
dc.contributorMarquezan, Luiz Henrique Figueira
dc.contributorKlann, Roberto Carlos
dc.creatorPavão, Gustavo Ramos
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-25T12:24:41Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-04T19:32:35Z
dc.date.available2023-01-25T12:24:41Z
dc.date.available2023-09-04T19:32:35Z
dc.date.created2023-01-25T12:24:41Z
dc.date.issued2022-09-22
dc.identifierhttp://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/27659
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8626558
dc.description.abstractEven with the use of compensation system to align operational decision-making and organizational objectives, executive directors can practice earnings management by operational decisions to achieve higher compensation and, with that, increase the disclosure of performance indicators to justify the remuneration received. Based on Agency Theory, this research analyzes the relationship between variable remuneration and earnings management through operational decisions (handling discretionary expenses, handling sales and production) with the level of disclosure of performance indicators of the remuneration policy of 115 companies listed on B3 (Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão) from 2012 to 2019. The research is classified as quantitative, descriptive and documentary. Descriptive analysis, Granger Causality Test and panel data regression were performed. It was evidenced, through the analyzes that, in the companies of the analyzed sample, the variable remuneration has little representation in the remuneration policy of the Statutory Board. Earnings management through operational decisions was practiced in order to report higher profits. It appears that variable remuneration is not related to earning management through operational decisions. The level of disclosure of compensation performance indicators increases when production levels are manipulated and when total and long-term variable compensation increases. The results also reveal that the disclosure of remuneration performance indicators decreases when the values of short-term variable remuneration increase, but the manipulation of discretionary expenses and sales do not impact the level of disclosure of the indicators. It is concluded that the increase in variable remuneration is not a sufficient element to induce the manager to practice earnings management through operation decisions and that the disclosure of performance indicators of remuneration contracts is a tool used by management hide their management practices of results per production and present a well-structured remuneration system in order to justify the portion of remuneration received in a variable way.
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Santa Maria
dc.publisherBrasil
dc.publisherControladoria, Governança e Sustentabilidade
dc.publisherUFSM
dc.publisherPrograma de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Contábeis
dc.publisherCentro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.subjectRemuneração de executivos
dc.subjectGerenciamento de resultados
dc.subjectIndicadores de desempenho
dc.subjectDivulgação
dc.subjectTeoria da Agência
dc.subjectExecutive compensation
dc.subjectEarnings management
dc.subjectPerformance indicators
dc.subjectDisclosure
dc.subjectAgency theory
dc.titleRelação entre o gerenciamento de resultados e remuneração dos executivos por meio da divulgação de indicadores de desempenho
dc.typeDissertação


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