dc.contributorSantos, César Schirmer dos
dc.contributorhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/4518010795079534
dc.contributorKrempel, Raquel
dc.contributorSant’Anna, André
dc.creatorWerberich, Matheus Diesel
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-14T11:40:03Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-04T19:30:52Z
dc.date.available2023-07-14T11:40:03Z
dc.date.available2023-09-04T19:30:52Z
dc.date.created2023-07-14T11:40:03Z
dc.date.issued2023-07-06
dc.identifierhttp://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/29681
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8626381
dc.description.abstractEpisodic memory is a mental state in which the subject has an imagistic representation of some event from his or her personal past. Such representation is usually rich in perceptual, emotional, and phenomenological details, and is crucial to our notion of personal identity over time. Since Aristotle, philosophers have wondered about the nature of memory, in particular about its relationship with imagination. In the last century, the question of whether episodic memory is a type of imagination has gained considerable prominence, mainly due to findings from cognitive neuroscience that remembering the past and imagining the future employ the same brain regions. This issue, known today as the (dis)continuist problem, has divided researchers between continuists, who argue that there is no fundamental difference between memory and imagination, and discontinuists, who argue that memory and imagination are fundamentally distinct mental states and processes. However, in contemporary literature little attention has been devoted to the meaning of the term “fundamentally distinct”, nor to what criteria are relevant for delimiting the mechanisms of episodic memory and imagination. The present dissertation fills this gap by drawing a dialogue between the philosophy of memory and the philosophy of cognitive science. Through three independent papers, I argue that the concept of “mechanism” is a fruitful tool for understanding and answering the (dis)continuist problem. Starting from this mechanistic analysis, I argue that there are no criteria free of pragmatic interests for the delineation of neurocognitive mechanisms. Therefore, any solution to the (dis)continuist problem is contingent on a particular framework of research, and we should be pluralists about the delimitation between episodic memory and imagination.
dc.publisherUniversidade Federal de Santa Maria
dc.publisherBrasil
dc.publisherFilosofia
dc.publisherUFSM
dc.publisherPrograma de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
dc.publisherCentro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
dc.subjectMemória episódica
dc.subjectImaginação
dc.subjectFilosofia da memória
dc.subjectMecanismos
dc.subjectFilosofia das ciências cognitivas
dc.subjectEpisodic memory
dc.subjectImagination
dc.subjectPhilosophy of memory
dc.subjectMechanisms
dc.subjectPhilosophy of the cognitive sciences
dc.titleThe mechanisms of time: delineating the systems for episodic memory and imagination
dc.typeDissertação


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