Can transparency increase adverse selection? Evidence from an electronic platform for annuities

dc.creatorFajnzylber, Eduardo
dc.creatorGabrielli, M. Florencia
dc.creatorWillington, Manuel
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-04T20:56:28Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-30T16:07:48Z
dc.date.available2023-08-04T20:56:28Z
dc.date.available2023-08-30T16:07:48Z
dc.date.created2023-08-04T20:56:28Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifierEduardo Fajnzylber, M. Florencia Gabrielli, Manuel Willington, Can transparency increase adverse selection? Evidence from an electronic platform for annuities, Economics Letters, Volume 228, 2023, 111135, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111135
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111135
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.udd.cl/handle/11447/7853
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8528558
dc.description.abstractWe show that the introduction of an electronic platform in the Chilean annuity market with the objectives of bringing transparency and enhancing competition also exacerbated adverse selection. The longevity gap between male annuitants and non-annuitants increased around 24 months
dc.languageen
dc.subjectAdverse selection
dc.subjectAnnuities
dc.subjectMarket transparency
dc.subjectChilean pension system
dc.titleCan transparency increase adverse selection? Evidence from an electronic platform for annuities
dc.typeArticle


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