dc.contributor | Botero Cadavid, Juan José | |
dc.creator | Quecan Mendoza, Juan Manuel | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-03T21:00:30Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-25T13:48:25Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-08-03T21:00:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-08-25T13:48:25Z | |
dc.date.created | 2023-08-03T21:00:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023-08-03 | |
dc.identifier | https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/84443 | |
dc.identifier | Universidad Nacional de Colombia | |
dc.identifier | Repositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombia | |
dc.identifier | https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/ | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8427016 | |
dc.description.abstract | Este trabajo pretende articular un punto de vista sobre un enfoque constructivo acerca de
la cognición. Desde un enfoque constructivo puede sugerirse que la cognición, su desarrollo,
configuraciones, modos, procesos, etc., se construyen y estructuran en y a través de
dinámicas interactivas corporales básicas de experiencia-y-acción en términos de las cuales
se explica, y a través de las cuales ocurre, la cognición.
En primer lugar, se ofrece un panorama del terreno intelectual donde pueden ubicarse los
lugares desde los cuales se ofrecen enfoques que abordan el tema de la cognición. Con base
en esto, se trazan algunas conexiones relevantes entre los puntos de vista en cuestión que
pueden contribuir al propósito planteado. Así, se señalan dos enfoques influyentes,
aparentemente incompatibles, acerca de la cognición 1
. Por un lado, está el enfoque
representacionalista. Desde este enfoque se sostiene que la cognición consiste,
esencialmente, en algún tipo de manipulación 2
interna 3
de contenido representacional
informacional4
. Por el otro lado se encuentra el enfoque enactivo el cual sugiere que la
cognición consiste, esencialmente, en el despliegue de dinámicas interactivas corporales
emergentes que sustentan y realizan la cognición. Así, en el terreno intelectual sobrevolado
puede encontrarse, por un lado, un enfoque desde el cual se sugiere que la cognición involucra, esencialmente, contenido representacional y, por otro lado, uno que sostiene que
ella, en su naturaleza básica, no involucra contenido representacional de ningún tipo.
A partir de la perspectiva que brinda este panorama, se plantea una continuidad
constructiva entre ambos tipos de aproximaciones. Esta continuidad, por un lado, reconoce
que la naturaleza básica de la cognición no puede reconstruirse en términos de contenido
representacional. Por otro lado, también reconoce que hay modos de cognición que
involucran la interacción con representaciones informativas. El vínculo constructivo que
pretende proponerse se articulada en torno a las nociones de normatividad básica y
estabilización. Estas nociones, se espera mostrar, pueden ayudar a cimentar la continuidad
constructiva propuesta. (Texto tomado de la fuente) | |
dc.description.abstract | This work aims to articulate a point of view regarding a constructivist approach to
cognition. From a constructivist approach it can be suggested that cognition, its development,
configurations, features, modes, processes, etc., are built and structured in and through basic
bodily action-experience interactive dynamics in terms of which cognition is explained, and
through which it occurs.
Firstly, there is an overview of the intellectual field in where lie approaches to cognition.
On this basis, some relevant connections between the approaches in issue are drawn in order
to achieve the stated purpose. Thus, two influential approaches to cognition -apparently
incompatible with each other- are pointed out (to this purpose I follow closely the work of
Hutto y Myin, 2013). On the one hand there is the representational approach to cognition.
From this approach is stated that cognition consists, essentially, in some sort of internal
manipulation of representational informational content (internal processing and production
of representational informational content in some sorts of cortical activity). On the other
hand, there is the enactive approach which suggests that cognition consists, essentially, in the
unfolding of emergent bodily interactive dynamics that sustain and deliver cognition. Thus,
in this intellectual field overflown can be founded, on one side, an approach according to
which cognition involves, essentially, representational content and, on the other side, an
approach according to which cognition, regarding its basic nature, does not involve
representational content of any sort.
From the perspective given by this overview, a constructive continuity between both
approaches is proposed. This continuity, first, recognize that the basic nature of cognition
cannot be rebuilt in representational content terms. Second, it also recognizes that there are
sorts of cognition that involve interaction with informational representations. The
constructive link to be proposed is articulated on the notions of basic normativity and
stabilization. These notions, I hope to show, can help to ground the constructive continuity
proposed. | |
dc.language | spa | |
dc.publisher | Universidad Nacional de Colombia | |
dc.publisher | Bogotá - Ciencias Humanas - Maestría en Filosofía | |
dc.publisher | Facultad de Ciencias Humanas | |
dc.publisher | Bogotá, Colombia | |
dc.publisher | Universidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá | |
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dc.rights | Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional | |
dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.title | Consideraciones relativas a un enfoque constructivo acerca de la cognición | |
dc.type | Trabajo de grado - Maestría | |