dc.contributorBotero Cadavid, Juan José
dc.contributorFilosofía y Cognición
dc.contributorBURITICÁ CHICA, ANDRÉS MAURICIO [0001459819]
dc.contributorAndrés Buriticá [XdAm6aUAAAAJ&hl=es]
dc.creatorBuriticá Chica, Andrés Mauricio
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-01T20:26:11Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-25T13:44:30Z
dc.date.available2023-08-01T20:26:11Z
dc.date.available2023-08-25T13:44:30Z
dc.date.created2023-08-01T20:26:11Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/84404
dc.identifierUniversidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.identifierRepositorio Institucional Universidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.unal.edu.co/
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8427009
dc.description.abstractPsychiatry is going through what in current debates has been called “the crisis of psychiatry”. One of the most relevant causes of the crisis of psychiatry has to do with the fact that it has not been successful in approaching psychiatric phenomena from a first-person perspective. Although many approaches to psychiatric phenomena have offered third-person perspectives (the biological/neuro-reductionist, the biopsychosocial, the objective-descriptive, or the values-based model), these perspectives leave aside the way subjects experience or live psychiatric phenomena. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder has not been alien to this crisis. In this regard, in this Dissertation, I want to offer an understanding of obsessive-compulsive phenomena from a first-person perspective, which is why I draw on phenomenology since it studies the structure of conscious experience. Particularly, I want to offer a description of obsessive-compulsive phenomena at the level of the lived obsessive-compulsive experience. In this respect, I provide an answer to the question: how can obsessive-compulsive phenomena be described at the level of the lived experience? The thesis I defend is that obsessive-compulsive phenomena are a disturbance at the level of existential feelings. This disturbance manifests itself through a feeling of perceptual decoupling that emerges as possibilities for action are not actualized or fulfilled. In obsessive-compulsive experience, the subjects’ world is structured as an uncertain space of possibilities.
dc.description.abstractLa psiquiatría atraviesa por lo que, en debates actuales, se ha llamado “la crisis de la psiquiatría”. Una de las causas de la crisis de la psiquiatría tiene que ver con el hecho de que ésta no ha logrado abordar exitosamente los fenómenos psiquiátricos desde una perspectiva de primera persona. Si bien muchos enfoques de los fenómenos psiquiátricos han ofrecido perspectivas de tercera persona (como los enfoques reduccionistas, el enfoque biopsicosocial, los enfoques descriptivos, o los modelos valorativos), estas perspectivas dejan de lado la forma en la que las personas experimentan o viven los fenómenos psiquiátricos. El Trastorno Obsesivo-Compulsivo no ha sido ajeno a esta crisis. Así, en esta Tesis quiero ofrecer una perspectiva para comprender los fenómenos obsesivo-compulsivos desde un enfoque de primera persona, por lo que acudo a la fenomenología considerando que ésta estudia la estructura de la experiencia consciente. En particular, quiero ofrecer una descripción de los fenómenos obsesivo-compulsivos al nivel de la experiencia obsesivo-compulsiva vivida. En este sentido, en esta investigación ofrezco una respuesta a la pregunta: ¿cómo describir los fenómenos obsesivo-compulsivos al nivel de la experiencia vivida? La tesis que defiendo es que los fenómenos obsesivo-compulsivos son una perturbación de los sentimientos existenciales. Esta perturbación se manifiesta a través de un sentimiento de desacople perceptivo que surge cuando las posibilidades de acción no se actualizan. En la experiencia obsesivo-compulsiva, el mundo de las personas se estructura como un espacio incierto de posibilidades. (Texto tomado de la fuente)
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad Nacional de Colombia
dc.publisherBogotá - Ciencias Humanas - Doctorado en Filosofía
dc.publisherFacultad de Ciencias Humanas
dc.publisherBogotá, Colombia
dc.publisherUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá
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dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleA phenomenological approach to Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
dc.typeTrabajo de grado - Doctorado


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