Trust in cohesive communitie
Journal Of Economic Theory
| dc.creator | Balmaceda, Felipe | |
| dc.creator | Escobar-Castro, Juan Fernando | |
| dc.date | 2018-09-05T21:32:31Z | |
| dc.date | 2022-07-07T15:12:37Z | |
| dc.date | 2018-09-05T21:32:31Z | |
| dc.date | 2022-07-07T15:12:37Z | |
| dc.date | 2017 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-08-22T09:39:20Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-08-22T09:39:20Z | |
| dc.identifier | 1130435 | |
| dc.identifier | 1130435 | |
| dc.identifier | https://hdl.handle.net/10533/219798 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8337107 | |
| dc.description | This paper studies which social networks maximize trust and welfare when agreements are implicitly enforced. We study a repeated trust game in which trading opportunities arise exogenously and a social network determines the information each player has. The main contribution of the paper is the characterization of optimal networks under alternative assumptions about how information flows across a network. When a defection is observed only by the victim's connections, cohesive networks are Pareto efficient as they allow players to coordinate their punishments to attain high equilibrium payoffs. In contrast, when a defection is observed by the victim's direct and indirect connections, barely connected networks maximize the number of players that can punish a defection and are therefore efficient. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords. Author Keywords:Repeated games; Social networks; Cohesiveness | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.relation | instname: Conicyt | |
| dc.relation | reponame: Repositorio Digital RI2.0 | |
| dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement//1130435 | |
| dc.relation | info:eu-repo/semantics/dataset/hdl.handle.net/10533/93477 | |
| dc.relation | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053117300571 | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ | |
| dc.title | Trust in cohesive communitie | |
| dc.title | Journal Of Economic Theory | |
| dc.type | Articulo | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |