JOURNAL OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING

dc.creatorAbarzua, Rodrigo
dc.creatorMartínez, Santi
dc.creatorMendoza, Valeria
dc.creatorThériault, Nicolás
dc.date2021-08-23T22:56:20Z
dc.date2022-07-07T02:36:02Z
dc.date2021-08-23T22:56:20Z
dc.date2022-07-07T02:36:02Z
dc.date2020
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-22T06:47:36Z
dc.date.available2023-08-22T06:47:36Z
dc.identifier1151326
dc.identifier1151326
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10533/251830
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8329285
dc.descriptionRecently, several research groups in cryptography have presented new elliptic curve models based on Edwards curves. These new curves were selected for their good performance and security perspectives. Cryptosystems based on elliptic curves in embedded devices can be vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCA), such as simple power analysis (SPA) or differential power analysis. In this paper, we analyze the existence of special points-whose use in SCA is known as same value analysis (SVA)-in the case of Edwards elliptic curves. These special points can be identified through a power analysis of the scalar multiplication. We show that all Edwards curves recently proposed for standardization contain some of these points and are therefore unsafe against SVA. As a countermeasure, we use the isogeny volcano approach to find SVA-secure isogenous curves to those proposed for standardization.Keywords Author Keywords:Elliptic curve cryptography; Side-channel attack; Same value analysis; Edwards curves KeyWords Plus:CHANNEL COLLISION ATTACKS
dc.descriptionRegular 2015
dc.descriptionFONDECYT
dc.descriptionFONDECYT
dc.languageeng
dc.relationhandle/10533/111557
dc.relationhandle/10533/111541
dc.relationhandle/10533/108045
dc.relationhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-019-00206-6
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleSame value analysis on Edwards curves
dc.titleJOURNAL OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING
dc.typeArticulo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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