Veto bargaining and the legislative process in multiparty presidential systems

Comparative Political Studies

dc.creatorPalanza-Barresi, María Valeria
dc.creatorSin, Gisela
dc.date2018-11-29T15:36:17Z
dc.date2022-07-07T15:40:46Z
dc.date2014
dc.date2018-11-29T15:36:17Z
dc.date2022-07-07T15:40:46Z
dc.date2014
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-22T03:01:13Z
dc.date.available2023-08-22T03:01:13Z
dc.identifier1140974
dc.identifier1140974
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10533/228184
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8313031
dc.descriptionThis article analyzes the use of vetoes in multiparty presidential systems. It suggests that the nature of executive-legislative bargaining is fundamentally altered when multiple parties compose the legislature and when presidential veto prerogatives are
dc.descriptionRegular
dc.descriptionFONDECYT
dc.descriptionFONDECYT
dc.languageeng
dc.relationhandle/10533/111556
dc.relationhandle/10533/111541
dc.relationhandle/10533/108045
dc.relationhttp://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0010414013489958
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleVeto bargaining and the legislative process in multiparty presidential systems
dc.titleComparative Political Studies
dc.typeArticulo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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