dc.contributorFigueroa, Nicolás
dc.contributorPONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE CHILE
dc.creatorGuadalupi, Carla
dc.date2021-01-26T19:10:49Z
dc.date2022-08-16T16:39:40Z
dc.date2021-01-26T19:10:49Z
dc.date2022-08-16T16:39:40Z
dc.date2015
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-22T01:51:21Z
dc.date.available2023-08-22T01:51:21Z
dc.identifier63140211
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10533/246511
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8307973
dc.descriptionThis thesis studies optimal signaling strategies in the presence of social learning and information acquisition. In particular, I consider a monopoly market with asymmetric information in which a firm is privately informed about product quality. Facing initial uncertainty, consumers may not only learn through prices (signaling) but also through social learning and information acquisition. I show that when consumers learn from others, either through word of mouth communication or observational learning, low introductory prices are used as signals of high quality. When, on the other hand, consumers may costly acquire information before purchasing, high prices signal high quality. I finally analyze time on the market as signal of quality when there is only one asset for sale over several periods.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.relationinstname: Conicyt
dc.relationreponame: Repositorio Digital RI2.0
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement//63140211
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/dataset/hdl.handle.net/10533/93488
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.subjectCiencias Sociales
dc.subjectEconomía y Negocios
dc.subjectEconomía
dc.titlePrices as signals of quality: experimentation and information acquisition
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typeTesis


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