A NOTE ON THE LARGE-FIRM MATCHING MODEL: CAN A NONBINDING MINIMUM WAGE REDUCE WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT?

MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS

dc.creatorBauducco, Sofia
dc.creatorJaniak, Alexandre
dc.date2021-08-23T22:54:11Z
dc.date2022-07-05T15:18:00Z
dc.date2021-08-23T22:54:11Z
dc.date2022-07-05T15:18:00Z
dc.date2017
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-21T21:45:18Z
dc.date.available2023-08-21T21:45:18Z
dc.identifier1151053
dc.identifier1151053
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10533/251333
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/8286247
dc.descriptionWe show that, in the large-firm search model, employment may decrease even when the level of the introduced minimum wage lies below the equilibrium wage of the laissez-faire economy. Wages also decrease in the presence of the minimum wage. The argument is based on multiple equilibria and the idea that, in a large-firm context, the representative firm may choose to overemploy workers in order to renegotiate lower wages.
dc.descriptionRegular 2015
dc.descriptionFONDECYT
dc.descriptionFONDECYT
dc.languageeng
dc.relationhandle/10533/111557
dc.relationhandle/10533/111541
dc.relationhandle/10533/108045
dc.relationhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100516000067
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleA NOTE ON THE LARGE-FIRM MATCHING MODEL: CAN A NONBINDING MINIMUM WAGE REDUCE WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT?
dc.titleMACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS
dc.typeArticulo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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