When a decision depends on others’ opinions, it is better to have as much information as possible in order to make a better-informed decision. This thesis studies how information transmission occurs from an adviser to a group of voters or committee. Under this framework, the adviser and committee members share preferences but differ in opinions. The committee has to decide whether or not to implement a policy proposal whose convenience depends on an unknown state of the world. The adviser can endogenously acquire verifiable information; that is, if he transmits this information, he can not lie. Thus, the adviser has incentives to obtain information, and voters can always make an informed decision under this framework. Regarding welfare, the adviser prefers a voting rule such the pivotal voter ends up being the voter whose opinion is closer to the adviser’s opinion. Such a voting rule results to be a simple majority rule. As a committee, voters should set a simple majority rule to incentivize the adviser to acquire as much information as possible and disclose it.