Tesis de maestría
Media bias and polarization
Registro en:
170510.pdf
Autor
Basilio Murillo, Sergio
Resumen
In this work I study production and consumption of information in group settings, with a communication model of a sender-receiver game for the market of news, with readers who have beliefs that they would like to see confirmed, and profit-maximizing media that can slant stories towards those beliefs. Using a model of spatial competition on a two-dimensional space, I show that, under monopoly market structure, slanting and price strategies are determined by the homogeneous beliefs shared by all readers and the correlation between the components of the two dimensional state of the world. Under duopoly competition, the determinants of slanting and price strategies are now heterogeneous beliefs and the type of complementarity between news and bias. Competition indeed lowers the prices and newspapers segment the market leading to social polarization.