Dignidade e autonomia na filosofia moral de Kant

Abstract

This work aims to investigate the relationship between dignity and autonomy in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Since for Kant, autonomy is the foundation of human dignity, the investigated problem is posed from the question about the moral status of human beings incapable of autonomous rational agency. Insofar as the concept of Kantian dignity is linked to autonomy and morality, it is necessary to investigate closely the different interpretations of Kantian ethics regarding the extension of the moral status of human individuals. In the wake of this problem, the problematization about the concept of person as a condition or not for the attribution of dignity to human beings who may not be capable of rational agency with autonomy unfolds. This dissertation seeks to investigate, from the Kantian ethical writings, elements that can illuminate the problem referred to in the light of the interpretation of commentators of Kant's work. The work is divided into three chapters. The first seeks to present the issue of Kantian dignity in apparent dissonance with the contemporary paradigm of dignity, present mainly within the scope of human rights discourse. In the second chapter, the work is concerned with presenting an overview of Kantian ethics in order to understand and discuss how Kant's conceptions of autonomy and dignity are linked and how much other Kantian postulates are in tune or not. During this journey, it is discussed how dignity and autonomy relate to the categorical imperative, especially with the Formula of Humanity, analyzing an apparent tension between personality and humanity within Kantian ethics. In the last chapter the text deals with some attempts to answer the problem of giving moral status to human beings incapable of autonomous rational agency in Kant's moral philosophy. Critical exposition of the interpretations of Allen Wood, Onora O'Neill, Patrick Kain, Oliver Sensen, Doris Schroeder and Paul Formosa is made. The theoretical contributions of these authors are confronted with each other, in an attempt to better clarify the difficulties faced by Kantian theory. It is concluded that there is significant divergence between some interpreters of Kant, with no full consensus on whether human dignity extends beyond those individuals incapable of autonomous rational agency. It seems that there are those who advocate an inclusive interpretation of dignity, in which all human beings are persons and have equal moral status, regardless of their capacity for autonomy, while others tend to a restrictive interpretation, giving greater emphasis to the role of autonomy and moral agency, which follows that not all human beings are persons, therefore they do not have the same moral status or dignity. It does not seem very clear, therefore, to what extent the concept of Kantian dignity is or is not in line with the contemporary view of human rights in postulating that every human being has dignity. The topic, although controversial, seems fundamental for those who consider that Kantian ethics offers a theoretical and practical alternative in the face of contemporary moral dilemmas.