dc.creatorVissing-Jorgensen, Annette
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-19T15:41:48Z
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-08T14:27:43Z
dc.date.available2021-10-19T15:41:48Z
dc.date.available2023-03-08T14:27:43Z
dc.date.created2021-10-19T15:41:48Z
dc.date.issued2021-10
dc.identifier978-956-7421-69-5
dc.identifier978-956-7421-70-1 (pdf)
dc.identifier0717-6686
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12580/6137
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5935409
dc.description.abstractAround the world, most central banks set policy by committee. This is motivated in part by the idea that groups reach better decisions than individuals and in part by a desire for representation of different geographical areas and economic constituencies in policymaking. The Bank for International Settlements (2009) documents that across central banks, the median number of members on monetary policy boards is eight. The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) have substantially more decision-makers than the median, with 19 members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) (of which 12 vote at any given time) and 25 members of the ECB’s Governing Council (of which 21 vote at any given time).
dc.languageen
dc.publisherBanco Central de Chile
dc.relationSeries on Central Banking Analysis and Economic Policies; no. 28
dc.relationSerie Banca Central, análisis y políticas económicas; no. 28
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile
dc.subjectBANCOS CENTRALES
dc.subjectCOMUNICACIÓN
dc.titleCentral banking with many voices: the communications arms race


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