dc.contributorSchwember Augier, Felipe
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-28T17:12:22Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-08T20:35:10Z
dc.date.available2022-01-28T17:12:22Z
dc.date.available2022-11-08T20:35:10Z
dc.date.created2022-01-28T17:12:22Z
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.uai.cl//handle/20.500.12858/3897
dc.identifier10.4067/S0718-090X2015000200008
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/5147039
dc.description.abstractThis work analyses the argument provided by Nozick in support of the State's legitimacy. It will be held that, in fact, this argument deals with two different difficulties: a descriptive one (the harmless and unintended emergence of the State) and another de jure (the legitimacy of the State). The first one is resolved by Nozick via the invisible-hand explanation, and the second one via so-called principle of compensation. I will attempt to demonstrate that this principle is consistent with Locke's political philosophy and, therefore, with lockean libertarianism.
dc.titleInvisible-Hand, Lockean Provisos and Private Justice: Emergence and State's Legitimacy in Anarchy, State and Utopia
dc.typeArtículo WoS


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