| dc.description.abstract | Aristotle’s argument against Timaeus’ view of intellection as an endless circular motion can be divided into two main sections: a categorial one, which rests upon the impossibility of intertwining material and immaterial ingredients into a single (albeit twofold) substance; and a geometrical one, which highlights those features of circular magnitudes which render them unsuitable for performing intellectual tasks. The paper argues that, far from being unrelated, both strands of Aristotle’s refutation make up a single argument, thanks to the physical commitments that such broader notions as “magnitude” and “contact” take on in this doxographical context. Although Aristotle shows himself willing to endorse a looser notion of “contact” elsewhere, the paper holds that such a way-out is not open to Timaeus, whose argument demands a straightforwardly physical connection between the cosmic
body and its soul. Keywords: soul, self-motion, circular motion, Aristotle, Timaeus | |
