A NOTE ON THE LARGE-FIRM MATCHING MODEL: CAN A NONBINDING MINIMUM WAGE REDUCE WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT?

dc.date.accessioned2021-08-23T22:54:11Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-10-19T00:22:35Z
dc.date.available2021-08-23T22:54:11Z
dc.date.available2022-10-19T00:22:35Z
dc.date.created2021-08-23T22:54:11Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10533/251333
dc.identifier1151053
dc.identifierWOS:000415986100013
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioslatinoamericanos.uchile.cl/handle/2250/4482596
dc.description.abstractWe show that, in the large-firm search model, employment may decrease even when the level of the introduced minimum wage lies below the equilibrium wage of the laissez-faire economy. Wages also decrease in the presence of the minimum wage. The argument is based on multiple equilibria and the idea that, in a large-firm context, the representative firm may choose to overemploy workers in order to renegotiate lower wages.
dc.languageeng
dc.relationhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100516000067
dc.relationhandle/10533/111557
dc.relation10.1017/S1365100516000067
dc.relationhandle/10533/111541
dc.relationhandle/10533/108045
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/
dc.titleA NOTE ON THE LARGE-FIRM MATCHING MODEL: CAN A NONBINDING MINIMUM WAGE REDUCE WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT?
dc.typeArticulo


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