dc.creatorMolina Castro, Juan David
dc.creatorRudnick Van de Wyngard, Hugh
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-13T19:15:21Z
dc.date.available2022-05-13T19:15:21Z
dc.date.created2022-05-13T19:15:21Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier10.1109/PES.2010.5589694
dc.identifier978-1424465514
dc.identifier1944-9925
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1109/PES.2010.5589694
dc.identifierhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=5589694
dc.identifierhttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/63899
dc.description.abstractThe debate on which is the best incentive for transmission expansion is still active. Discussions center on economic mechanisms based on game theory to expand transmission. There is a mix of experiences and they vary in function of the level of interaction of market agents. Identifying the agents' strategies will allow a better understanding of the market's dynamics. This article assesses regulatory incentives based on the market for transmission expansion. Game theory fundamentals are developed, namely, the cooperative and non-cooperative games. Four base cases of a bi-nodal model were implemented. It is claimed that given the individual interests (egotistical) and grid characteristics (non-stored energy, circulating flows and variables), the transmission expansion fits better to a non-cooperative model. An alternative analysis is the design of Bayesian mechanisms.
dc.languageen
dc.publisherIEEE
dc.relationIEEE PES General Meeting (2010 : Minneapolis, MN, Estados Unidos)
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectGames
dc.subjectBiological system modeling
dc.subjectGenerators
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectGame theory
dc.subjectMathematical model
dc.subjectInvestments
dc.titleTransmission expansion investment: Cooperative or non-cooperative game?
dc.typecomunicación de congreso


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