Entrepreneurial action as human action: Sometimes judgment-driven, sometimes not

Abstract

This article elaborates on a lively and rapidly evolving conversation central to entrepreneurship: the underpinnings of entrepreneurial action. In particular, we respond to a critique published in this journal by Brown, Packard, and Bylund (BPB), in which they argue that all EA is based on intendedly-rational judgment. The empirical reality of rational, deliberative intentionality in entrepreneurship is beyond dispute and we have argued that behavioral logics do not simply supplant intendedly-rational ones. However, mounting evidence suggests that the wide-spectrum framework developed by Lerner, Hunt and Dimov – ranging from impulse-driven, a-rational action to deeply deliberative, rational action – offers a more veridical and useful perspective. Although BPB's critique succeeds in underscoring the exciting challenges facing entrepreneurship scholars; in our view, the critique largely relies on philosophical argumentation and definitional boundary-setting that are inconsistent with decades of scientific advancement in the psychological sciences. Given this, and recent empirical evidence from entrepreneurship scholars, we think it would be counter-productive to consider entrepreneurship as the sole domain of human activity completely circumscribed by rational judgment.