info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism
Fecha
2017-08Registro en:
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique; Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism; Springer; Erkenntnis; 82; 4; 8-2017; 715-738
0165-0106
CONICET Digital
CONICET
Autor
Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique
Resumen
In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection (only an accepted content can be a reason), that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of acceptance of their contents.