位于现在的过去：怀特、奥尔巴赫 与米德之间的人文主义联系

Abstract

In this article, through an inquiry on White’s appropriation of Auerbach's figural realism, I would like us to consider whether the belief in a “past reality”, “independent” of our historical constructions, is a condition for their legitimacy. Two alternative and opposed approaches on the subject can be found in philosophical literature on history. One from a representationalist perspective, developed by Arthur Danto, and the other from a pragmatist perspective, carried forward by George H. Mead.2 My proposal in what follows aims to show the structural similarity and the shared philosophical roots of Auerbach’s-White's consideration of figural realism, on the one hand, and Mead's consideration of past-present and mindworld relations (perspectivist realism), on the other. White’s and Auerbach's inquiries on historical and literary realism couple better with Meadean pragmatism than with Dantian representationalism. This connection will allow me to show that, contrary to what is suspected by most of his critics (but also by his generous readers), clinging to the belief in a reality “independent” of historical constructions will be what would make Whitean constructivism stumble towards skepticism. “Realism”, “past reality”, “historical fact” are all controversial notions; far from being unproblematic research assumptions, they require or demand being examined in their uses or meanings. Of course, this pragmatist reading (with Meadean roots) of Auerbach-White's approach to realism has no (explicit) textual support. There is no evidence of cross readings in this regard. Still, as will be seen in what follows, the connection is enabled, on the one hand, by Hegel's proven influence on Auerbach and Mead and, on the other, by a still unexplored, but no less important, anti-Cartesian humanism. This stance, which rejects the subject-object dualism, is explicitly shared by Mead and implicitly by Auerbach and White, due to the unavoidable presence in their work of their anti-Cartesian predecessor Giambattista Vico.

本文通过探究怀特对奥尔巴赫比喻实在论的运用，旨在思考这 样一个问题 ：相信“过去的实在性”，即相信过去“独立于”我们历史建 构的性质，是不是怀特与奥尔巴赫合法性的一个前提条件。我会证明下述 两方之间具有结构相似性与共同的哲学根源 ：一方是奥尔巴赫和怀特对比 喻实在论的思考，另一方是米德对过去与现在关系的思考（视角主义实在 论）。这种联系使我得出与大多数怀特批判者（也包括态度宽厚的怀特读 者）相反的结论 ：坚信实在“独立于”历史建构，会令怀特的建构主义逐 渐沦为怀疑主义。“实在论”“过去的实在性”“历史事实”都是有争议的 观念。它们远非毫无问题的研究假设，它们的用法或意义需要或要求加以 审查。当然，奥尔巴赫与怀特对实在论的实用主义解读（源于米德），并 没有（明确的）文本支持。在这方面，没有交叉阅读的证据。不过，正如 下文所述，这种联系成为可能取决于两个前提条件 ：一个是黑格尔对奥尔 巴赫和米德已经证实的影响，另一个是仍未得到研究但同样重要的反笛卡 尔的人文主义。对于这种否定主客二元论的立场，米德明确支持，奥尔巴 赫与怀特含蓄地认同，这是由于他们的反笛卡尔前辈维柯的影响。