info:eu-repo/semantics/article
The effect of social norms on bribe offers
Fecha
2018-07-20Registro en:
Abbink, Klaus; Freidin, Esteban; Gangadharan, Lata; Moro, Rodrigo; The effect of social norms on bribe offers; Oxford University Press; Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; 34; 3; 20-7-2018; 457-474
8756-6222
1465-7341
CONICET Digital
CONICET
Autor
Abbink, Klaus
Freidin, Esteban
Gangadharan, Lata
Moro, Rodrigo
Resumen
We report a sequential bribery game to disentangle the effect of descriptive social norms among public officials on bribe offers by firms. Participants who knew that they were interacting with a partner from a group with a majority of corrupt (as opposed to honest) partners offered twice as many bribes. This effect of norms occurred independently of strategic considerations and the possibility of being sanctioned. Indeed, the effect of sanctions was not significant. These findings highlight a causal connection from perceptions of bribery to actual behavior.