Who generates cohesion? : a comparative analysis of business networks in Latin America

Abstract

Within a comparative political economy framework, this thesis applies social network analysis to the study of business in Latin America using data from firm's board of directors membership. The main contributions are threefold. First, it introduces a novel methodological tool that can provide useful metrics about how firms are interconnected, in particular measuring the cohesiveness of national business communities. Interestingly, these country-level metrics are benchmarked with hypotheses from the literature on business politics in Latin America and two preliminary correlations indicating a negative relationship between elite cohesion and tax revenues as well as a lack of association between business cohesion and formal property rights are presented. Second, it provides new evidence indicating that even after more than two decades of financial liberalization and contrary to arguments about globalization and convergence, corporate control is still distinctively defined at the national level. Third, it explores the most salient actors that characterize governance regimes in Chile and Brazil: respectively, business groups and investment managers. Asset managers, as those prevalent in the Brazilian network are an under-theorized actor; this paper therefore advances in a description of the distinctive characteristics of this novel corporate governance player. It also explores and contrast each country's most connected director's links with both business associations and political parties.